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CONTRACTS SCHOLARSHIP IN THE AGE OF 
THE ANTHOLOGY 
E. Allan Farnsworth* 
As every fledgling law student knows, a revolution in legal educa-
tion began in the fall of 1870 when Christopher Columbus Langdell 
opened his course in contracts at the Harvard Law School by asking, 
"Mr. Fox, will you state the facts in Payne v. Cave?"1 Langdell's 
casebook, published in 1871, ushered in what I call the Age of Anthol-
ogy in American contracts scholarship.2 
Although it is not our habit to speak of casebooks as anthologies, 
Langdell could not have been unaware of The Golden Treasury, Fran-
cis Turner Palgrave's famous anthology oflyric poetry, published only 
a decade before. 3 Like Palgrave, Langdell arranged his selections on 
chronological principles, to show historical development. 4 And like 
Palgrave's fiorilegium, Langdell's collection was pristine, without 
comment by the editor and unadulterated by extraneous material - a 
true "gathering of fiowers."5 Much the same can be said of the 
volumes of contracts cases compiled by Williston, Huffcut and Wood-
ward, Keener, Corbin, and Costigan, who kept the Age of the Anthol-
* Alfred McCormack Professor of Law, Columbia University. B.S. 1948, University of 
Michigan; M.A. 1949, Yale University; J.D. 1952, Columbia University. - Ed. 
The Michigan Law Review invited me to review Langdell's contracts casebook when it was 
reprinted in 1983, but I concluded that I could not do so. Nagging questions about its place in 
contracts scholarship, however, provoked me to the inquiries that resulted in what follows. I am 
grateful to the Review for publishing something quite different from what they invited, and after 
so long a delay. For suggestions, I am grateful to Bruce A. Ackerman, Sheldon W. Halpern, 
Michael H. Hoeflich, Margaret N. Kniffen, Robert M. Loyd, Janet L. Richards, Jeffrey P. Trout, 
and G. Edward White. 
I. 2 C. WARREN, HISTORY OF THE HARVARD LAW SCHOOL 372 (1908). 
2. This article does not, with minor exceptions, discuss casebooks or scholarship in fields 
other than contracts. This is not only because contracts is the field in which Langdell produced 
the first casebook but also because it is the field that I know best. Whether some of what I say 
here is true of other fields is for the reader to decide. 
3. F. PALGRAVE, THE GOLDEN TREASURY OF THE BEST SONGS AND LYRICAL POEMS IN 
THE ENGLISH LANGUAGE (1861). 
4. Id. at xi. Grant Gilmore deprecated Langdell's practice of arranging English cases and 
then American cases in chronological order within each subject matter. G. GILMORE, THE 
DEATH OF CoNTRAcr 13 (1974). But in the nineteenth century, literary anthologies came to be 
organized on just such chronological principles. See 1 THE NEW ENCYCLOPAEDIA BRITANNICA 
443 (Micropaedia 15th ed. 1974). 
5. This is the meaning of the Greek from which "anthology" is derived. The classic anthol· 
ogy is Meleager's Garland, a collection of short epigrammatic poems, some by Meleager himself, 
compiled in the first century B.C. See 1 THE NEW ENCYCLOPAEDIA BRITANNICA, supra note 4, 
at 443. 
1406 
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ogy alive during the next half century. They, too, adhered by and 
large to the tradition of apparent neutrality begun by Langdell. · 
The Age - at least as I conceive it - came to an end in the 1940s 
when the true anthology passed out of fashion. Casebooks had out-
grown their primal purity and had become mixtures of "cases and 
materials" in which the views, opinions, and theories of interventionist 
editors are frankly and unapologetically expressed and openly and vig-
orously supported, not only by cases but by selections from secondary 
sources. This change was, in contrast to that sparked by Langdell, a 
gradual transformation, wrought by a variety of twentieth-century 
casebook editors. The most influential were Patterson and Goble, who 
published in 1941, Fuller, who published in 1947, and Kessler and 
Sharp, who published in 1953. The Age discussed in this article thus 
spans some eighty years between the publication of Langdell's anthol-
ogy and the appearance of these modem casebooks. 
In the first part of this article, I trace the history of the Age. I 
observe that for nearly forty years, from 1881 to the time of World 
War I, there was a significant decline in contracts scholarship and con-
clude that the principal explanation for these lean years lies in the shift 
in scholars' focus from an audience of practitioners to one of students 
that resulted from the introduction of the case method. In the second 
part of the article, I look at the way in which the anthologists wielded 
the considerable influence that each had when only a few contracts 
casebooks dominated the market. I consider also such matters as their 
heavy emphasis on English cases, their exclusion of such major topics 
as remedies, and their abstinence from the use of anything other than 
cases. I conclude that although these early anthologists were blatant 
in their attempts to simplify and to rationalize the state of contract 
law, their espousal of particular doctrines was more restrained and 
subtle. In the third and final part of the article, I examine the way in 
which these early anthologists espoused particular doctrines in two 
specific and related areas: reliance on an offer of a unilateral contract 
and reliance on a gratuitous promise. I conclude that though the 
anthologies reflected the anthologists' views on these matters, the 
anthologies themselves had little impact on the development of 
doctrine. 
I. HISTORY OF THE ANTHOLOGY 
A. What Came Before the Age: 1800-1870 
Contracts scholarship was slow in coming to this side of the Atlan-
tic. During the early part of the nineteenth century, American law-
yers leaned heavily on English writers. William Blackstone's 
influential Commentaries on English law, which was available in 
American editions from the beginning of the century, paid little atten-
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tion to contracts, 6 but subsequent English authors who devoted entire 
books to contracts were also well known in America and were favored 
with American editions. They included John Joseph Powell, Joseph 
Chitty, Charles Greenstreat Addison, Stephen Martin Leake, and 
John William Smith. 7 But neither of the two great American treatise 
writers of the early nineteenth century, James Kent and Joseph Story, 
had much to say about contracts as such, 8 and it was not until the 
century was roughly half over that the subject began to capture the 
fancy of American authors. The best known and most influential 
works were by William Story and Theophilus Parsons.9 
William Story, son of the great Joseph, began his legal career by 
combining the practice of law with the writing of treatises. His one-
volume work on contracts appeared in 1844, only four years after his 
graduation from the Harvard Law School, and quickly became a stan-
dard in its field. 10 In 1856, however, after editing the fourth edition of 
his treatise, Story gave up the practice of law and the writing of law 
books for the temptations of sculpture, in which he was also accom-
plished, and settled in Rome. His treatise survived one more edition in 
1874. 
Story's work soon had a formidable competitor, for in 1853 The-
ophilus Parsons, Dane Professor at the Harvard Law School, pub-
lished a two-volume treatise on contracts. 11 Parsons, an indefatigable 
6. For a brief discussion of Blackstone's treatment of contracts, see F. KESSLER, G. GIL· 
MORE & A. KRONMAN, CoNTRACTS: CASES AND MATERIALS 42-46 (3d ed. 1986). 
7. There were also American editions of Sir Edward Fry's work on the specific performance 
of contracts. For discussion of nineteenth-century English works on contracts, see Simpson, 
Innovation in Nineteenth Century Contract Law, 91 L.Q. REV. 247, 250-57 (1975). 
8. See J. KENT, COMMENTARIES ON AMERICAN LAW (1826-1830). Although Kent's four-
volume work devoted considerable space to such commercial topics as agency, partnerships, bail-
ments, negotiable paper, and maritime law, the only organized discussion of contract was of the 
contract of sale of goods, which filled some seventy pages in the part on personal property. See 2 
id. at 363-436. 
Although Story, as Gilmore points out, wrote treatises on many specialized bodies of law, "it 
never occurred to him to write a treatise on 'Contracts.'" G. GILMORE, supra note 4, at 11. 
Story did, however, produce a one-volume commentary on the law ofbailments in 1832 and a 
two-volume commentary on equity jurisprudence in 1836, the latter including such aspects of 
contract law as mistake, fraud, specific performance, and assignments. 
Two early Ameriean works were G. VERPLANCK, AN EssAY ON THE DOCTRINE OF CON-
TRACTS (1825) (a short volume inquiring into "How Contracts are Affected in Law and Morals 
by Concealment, Error, or Inadequate Price") and D. CHIPMAN, AN EssAY ON THE LAW OF 
CoNTRACTS FOR THE PAYMENT OF SPECJFJCK ARTICLES (1822) (a small volume directed more 
at the practitioner). 
9. Another, lesser known, writer of this era was Theron Metcalf. See T. METCALF, PRINCI· 
PLES OF THE LAW OF CONTRACTS (1867), a short text that saw a second edition in 1888 by F. 
Heard. See also c. BROWNE, A TREATISE ON THE CONSTRUCTION OF THE STATUTE OF 
FRAUDS (1857), which had later editions in 1863, 1870, 1880, and by J. Bailey in 1895. 
10. W. STORY, A TREATISE ON THE LAW OF CONTRACTS NOT UNDER SEAL (1844), The 
fourth edition in 1856, the last edition prepared by Story, was in two volumes, a reaction in part 
to Parsons' two-volume work. 
11. T. PARSONS, THE LAW OF CONTRACTS (1853). Beginning with the fifth edition in 1866 
there were three volumes. 
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writer who went on to author seven more treatises, had a felicity of 
style, a clarity of statement, and a penchant for generalization that 
made his contracts treatise a huge best seller.12 As one reviewer 
wrote, 
[T]he law is presented in a style of transparent clearness, and the points 
are stated with mathematical precision - the author never allowing 
himself to be turned aside from the precise matter in hand, and carefully 
excluding everything that can divert the mind from following the discus-
sion to its legitimate results.13 
It endured through nine editions, the last in 1904.14 
B. The Age of Anthology Begins: 1871-1880 
One of the young law students who helped Parsons to prepare his 
footnotes later spent sixteen years as a bookish lawyer in New York 
City and then was called back in 1870 to take Parsons' place as Dane 
Professor. During the spring of that year he collected cases and by fall 
Christopher Columbus Langdell was able to put in the hands of his 
students the advance sheets for the book of Cases that ushered in the 
Age of Anthology.15 
By present-day standards, it was a curious work. It contained 336 
cases, only slightly edited, without commentary. Only twenty-two of 
the cases were American, mostly from Massachusetts and New York. 
Virtually all of the rest were English, many of these having been de-
cided before 1700. The cases were divided into but three chapters enti-
tled "Mutual Consent," "Consideration," and "Conditional 
Contracts," leaving the rest of the subject of contracts untouched.16 
12. See 2 C. WARREN, supra note l, at 312. 
13. Notice of New Book, 2 AM. L. REG. 190, 190-91 (1854) (quoting from an unidentified 
source). As Parsons himself put it, "I have endeavored to state in the text what I think to be the 
law; and in the notes I have endeavored to enable the reader to judge for himself whether I am 
.right." 1 T. PARSONS, supra note 11, at ix (1853). 
Williston said of his predecessor as Dane Professor of Law that though Parsons' works were 
~·more voluminous" than Greenleaf's, "probably it may be said without undue harshness, that 
they were deservedly less influential in the development of the law." S. WILLISTON, SOME MOD-
ERN TENDENCIES IN THE LAW 111 (1929). 
14. The ninth edition was described as an "antiquity" by a reviewer who thought that the 
work "in and of itself has no place in the modem scientific development of study and instruction 
in the Jaw of contracts-unless it be to mark a phase of their history." Book Review, 5 COLUM. 
L. REV. 71, 71 (1905). 
15. c. LANGDELL, A SELECTION OF CASES ON THE LAW OF CONTRACTS (1871) [hereinaf-
ter C. LANGDELL, CASES]. This was not, however, the first collection ofleading cases. The best-
known of several English collections is J. SMITH, A SELECTION OF LEADING CASES ON v ARIOUS 
BRANCHES OF THE LAW WITH NOTES (1838-1840). Nor was it even the first use of cases for law 
teaching. See J. HURST, THE GROWTH OF AMERICAN LAW: THE LAW MAKERS 261 (1950) 
(describing John Norton Pomeroy's use of cases at New York University Law School in the 
1860s). 
16. In 1983 the casebook was reprinted by the Legal Classics Library with a helpful intro-
duction by Thomas G. Barnes that discusses the casebook. The numbers of cases given in this 
article accord with those in the introduction. Counting cases is not, however, an exact science. 
Thus Kingston v. Preston is not counted because Langdell presented it as part of the opinion in 
1410 Michigan Law Review [Vol. 85:1406 
Nevertheless, for the better part of a century Langdell's Cases and its 
heavily revised descendants were carried to first-year law classes 
throughout the United States.17 
Langdell made few changes when a second edition was issued in 
1879,18 having already given over the contracts course to his disciple 
James Barr Ames. The second edition was noteworthy not for its 
cases but for its appendix, a short text of some 250 pages, which was 
separately published with minor revisions as Langdell's Summary in 
1880.19 Unlike the works of Story and Parsons, which were addressed 
primarily to practitioners, the Summary was written mainly for stu-
dents. Its sixteen chapters, oddly arranged in alphabetical order, cov-
ered only the areas dealt with in the casebook, and the list of cases 
discussed in the Summary is substantially the same as that contained 
in the casebooks. 20 A hostile reviewer conceded that "it is a valuable 
review of the matter presented in the cases" and that "it performs one 
important office: it points out which of them are overruled."21 Never-
theless, courts often cited it and, though it was never revised, citations 
continued through the first third of this century, even after Williston's 
treatise appeared. 22 
The popularity of the Summary is somewhat surprising in view of 
Langdell's propensity for espousing views that did not stand the test of 
time.23 He wrote that the "consequences of a contract's being unilat-
eral or bilateral are many and important"24 and laid great stress on a 
Jones v. Barkley, and Haigh v. Brooks and Brooks v. Haigh are counted as one case because 
Langdell so presented them. 
17. Williston added a second volume in 1894. See text at note 54 infra. The Langdell-Willis-
ton combination then saw six editions under Williston's name in 1903, 1922, 1930, 1937, 1949, 
and 1954, the last edition edited by William Tell Laube. 
18. Langdell deleted "some of the less important cases," some 30 in all, and added some 20 
cases. 
19. c. LANGDELL, A SUMMARY OF THE LAW OF CONTRACTS (2d ed. 1880) [hereinafter c. 
LANGDELL, SUMMARY]. In a few instances, signaled in the preface, Langdell added footnotes in 
this edition to indicate a change of view. 
20. Since the book as a whole was to be only a fragment, it was not thought worth while 
to divide it into chapters and sections, to be arranged in consecutive order, but the easier 
method was adopted of treating the different subjects separately and independently, and 
arranging them in alphabetical order. 
Id. at v. 
21. Book Review, 5 S. L. REv. 872, 873 (1880). For a more favorable assessment by Wood-
ruff, see Book Review, 6 CoRNELL L.Q. 130 (1920), describing Langdell's Summary as "an in-
tense and relentless re-examination of the foundations of the subject." 
22. For examples from cases in the New York Court of Appeals, see Mascioni v. I.B. Miller, 
Inc., 261 N.Y. 1, 4, 181 N.E. 473, 473-74 (1933); Coletti v. Knox Hat Co., 252 N.Y. 468, 472, 
169 N.E. 648, 649-50 (1930); Petterson v. Pattberg, 248 N.Y. 86, 88, 161 N.E. 428, 429 (1928); 
Allegheny College v. National Chautauqua Bank, 246 N.Y. 369, 373, 381, 159 N.E. 173, 174, 
177 (1927). 
23. Grant Gilmore unkindly characterized Langdell as "an essentially stupid man who, early 
in his life, hit on one great idea to which, thereafter, he clung with all the tenacity of genius." G. 
GILMORE, THE AGES OF AMERICAN LAW 42 (1977). 
24. c. LANGDELL, SUMMARY, supra note 19, § 187. See generally id. §§ 183-87. 
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distinction that has been abandoned in the Restatement (Second) of 
Contracts "because of doubt as to [its] utility."25 He inveighed against 
the mailbox rule, though he conceded that "it has been supposed to be 
pretty well settled . . . that the contract is complete the moment the 
letter of acceptance is mailed."26 He argued against the "common 
opinion" - today generally accepted - that a binding agreement not 
to revoke an offer makes the offer irrevocable, contending that an ir-
revocable offer is a "legal impossibility" and that such an agreement is 
therefore "not a contract of which it is possible for equity to enforce 
specific performance."27 He also seems to have been bested by Willis-
ton in a law review debate over Langdell's attempt to apply the notion 
of legal detriment to the enforceability of mutual promises. 28 
Langdell was not, however, the only American scholar active in 
25. REsl'ATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS§ 1 reporter's note (1981). As Llewellyn had 
pointed out, "The analysis which to all of us has been as if eternal, with its neatly boxed 'Did A 
want a promise or an act?' ... appears in print first less than seventy years ago." Llewellyn, Our 
Case Law of Contract: Offer and Acceptance (pt. 1), 48 YALE L.J. 1, 32-33 (1938). Llewellyn 
advocated relegating "that great dichotomy of the first year classroom" to "the freak-tent." Id. 
at 36. See also Pettit, Modem Unilateral Contracts, 63 B.U. L. REv. 551 (1983). 
26. C. LANGDELL, SUMMARY, supra note 19, § 14; see Grey, Langdell's Orthodoxy, 45 U. 
Prrr. L. REV. 1, 34 (1983). This did not even earn Langdell a citation in the only two modem 
cases to have seriously questioned the rule. Rhode Island Tool Co. v. United States, 128 F. Supp. 
417 (Ct. Cl. 1955); Dick v. United States, 82 F. Supp. 326 (Ct. Cl. 1949). 
27. c. LANGDELL, SUMMARY, supra note 19, § 178. 
28. The incident suggests the level of discourse of the time. In § 84 of his Summary, Langdell 
had written that it sometimes happens that a promise to do something will be consideration when 
actually doing it will not be. He had in mind the situation in which C makes a promise to A in 
return for A's promise to C to render a performance that A already owes to B. Langdell thought 
that A's promise was consideration for C's promise, though A's actual performance would not 
have been because of the preexisting duty rule. Pollock agreed, but Williston thought otherwise, 
as did Anson, and took issue with Langdell and Pollock in the Harvard Law Review. See Willis-
ton, Successive Promises of the Same Performance, 8 HARV. L. REv. 27 (1894). 
Williston proposed a test under which a promise would be consideration only if the promiser 
promises "something the performance of which will be, or may be, a detriment." Id. at 36. 
Williston considered the argument that A, by making the second promise to C incurs a detriment 
because A is now under two obligations rather than one. But Williston thought this reasoning 
fallacious because it assumes that A's second promise is binding, which in tum assumes that C's 
counterpromise is binding, the very point in dispute. He added that the same problem of circu-
larity arises in the case of every bilateral contract. 
Langdell responded seven years later, explaining that a writer should not remain silent in the 
face of an assertion that "seems nearly equivalent to asserting that he is either incompetent or 
dishonest," noting that he would have replied sooner but "it was not till about a year ago that my 
attention was first called to the article." Langdell, Mutual Promises as a Consideration for Each 
Other, 14 HARV. L. REv. 496, 498 & n.1 (1901). Langdell explained that Williston's point was 
not a matter for him to have dealt with in § 84, where his disputed statement was found, but 
rather in § 81, where the enforceability of exchanges of promises was discussed in general. There 
was therefore "no begging the question in the passages which have been quoted. . . . Everything 
necessary to raise that question ... I assumed to exist, and, therefore, I assumed that each of the 
promises, if supported by a sufficient consideration, was binding." Id. at 501-02. For the reader 
who remained unconvinced, Langdell added that even if he and Pollock had begged the question, 
"the only consequence is that we have not proved the proposition which we were supporting, -
not that the proposition itself is untrue." Id. at 498. 
Williston later wrote that though Langdell had written that Williston had accused him of 
intellectual dishonesty or of incompetence, this did not hurt their personal relations, which were 
"so slight because of [Langdell's] reticent and aloof habits that our difference of opinion on the 
1412 Michigan Law Review [Vol. 85:1406 
the field of contracts during the first decade of the Age of Anthology. 
In the fall of 1880, the year that the Summary appeared, Oliver Wen-
dell Holmes delivered twelve lectures that in the following year be-
came his book The Common Law. 29 Although Holmes was under 
forty and not yet a professor or a judge, the three lectures allotted to 
contracts - totalling less than a hundred pages - were to have a 
lasting impact on the subject. 
Holmes made three notable contributions. One was his advocacy 
of the bargain theory of consideration, in which he delivered the cele-
brated aphorism that "[c]onsideration is a form as much as a seal" and 
formulated the requirement of a "relation of reciprocal conventional 
inducement" between consideration and promise. 30 Another was his 
espousal of the objective theory of contract: "The law has nothing to 
do with the actual state of the parties' minds."31 A third was his de-
scription of the remedial consequences of a breach of contract, under 
which the "only universal consequence of a legally binding promise is, 
that the law makes the promisor pay damages if the promised event 
does not come to pass."32 Less notable was his advocacy of the now-
discredited "tacit agreement test," under which in applying the rule of 
Hadley v. Baxendale, a defendant was not liable for a risk "unless the 
assumption of that risk is to be taken as having fairly entered into the 
contract."33 Holmes, of course, had an advantage not given to Lang-
dell in adding permanence to his views: he could repeat them from the 
bench and was not reluctant to do so. 34 
During the same decade, important developments in contracts 
scholarship were also occurring in England, with the appearance of 
works by Sir Frederick Pollock and Sir William Anson. The English 
legal historian A. W.B. Simpson has written that "the tradition of trea-
tise writing by academics began with Pollock and Anson," noting that 
earlier authors had written "as young men to advertise themselves, or 
law of consideration caused no friction." s. WILLISTON, LIFE AND LAW: AN AUTOBIOGRAPHY 
138 (1940). 
29. 0.W. HOLMES, THE COMMON LAW (1881). 
30. Id. at 273, 293-94. 
31. Id. at 309. 
32. Id. at 301. 
33. Id. 
34. On consideration, he rephrased his aphorism likening consideration to a seal in Krell v. 
Codman, 154 Mass. 454, 456, 28 N.E. 578, 578 (1891) ("consideration is as much a form as a 
seal"), and used the notion of reciprocal "conventional inducement" in Wisconsin & Mich. Ry. 
v. Powers, 191 U.S. 379, 386 (1903) ("not enough that the promise induces the detriment or that 
the detriment induces the promise if the other half is wanting"). On the remedial consequences 
of breach of contract, his views are reflected in Globe Ref. Co. v. Landa Cotton Oil Co., 190 U.S. 
540, 544 (1903) ("If a contract is broken the measure of damages generally is the same, whatever 
the cause of the breach."). Globe Refining also expressed the "tacit agreement" test. 190 U.S. at 
543 ("extent ofliability •.. should be worked out on terms which it fairly may be presumed [the 
defendant] would have assented to if they had been presented to his mind"). 
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simply to make ends meet."35 The works of Pollock and Anson were 
to wield great influence in the United States. 
In 187 6 Pollock, then of Cambridge and later of Oxford, published 
his Principles, a one-volume treatise that was to have several American 
editions, including one by Williston in 1906.36 The book's impact in 
America was not enhanced by its abstraction and sophistication, and 
its usefulness was diminished because it did not treat the subjects of 
performance and discharge.37 Nonetheless, it won immediate respect 
on both sides of the Atlantic, and its influence on this side continued 
well into the present century. 
In 1879 Anson, of Oxford, published his Principles, a short book 
directed at students in the recently established course in contracts at 
that university.38 It was both more elementary and more comprehen-
sive than Pollock's book and enjoyed great popularity in the United 
States, where it went through many American editions, including 
three by Corbin in 1919, 1924, and 1930. As late as 1919, a reviewer 
hailed it as "probably the best short book yet published" on con-
tracts, 39 though not all judgments were so favorable.40 
C. The Lean Years: 1881-World War I 
After such an auspicious first decade, it might have been expected 
35. Simpson, The Rise and Fall of the Legal Treatise: Legal Principles and the Forms of 
Legal Literature, 48 U. CHI. L. REv. 632, 664 (1981) (footnote omitted). Simpson also notes 
that Leake apparently was encouraged to write his work on contracts "after his deafness had 
ruined his law practice." Id. 
36. F. POLLOCK, PRINCIPLES OF CONTRACT AT LAW AND IN EQUITY (1876). On Willis-
ton's edition, see text at note 65 infra. 
37. In the preface to his sixth edition in 1893, Anson wrote that Pollock did not write "for 
beginners" and that Pollock's book was "a treatise on the Formation of Contract." W. ANSON, 
PRINCIPLES OF THE ENGLISH LAW OF CONTRACT v-vi (6th ed. 1893). 
38. W. ANSON, PRINCIPLES OF THE ENGLISH LAW OF CONTRACT (1879). The first Ameri-
can edition was by 0. Aldrich in 1880. On Corbin's editions, see text following note 65 infra. 
39. Arant, Book Review, 29 YALE L.J. 134, 134 (1919). Pollock thought Anson to be "the 
best elementary book yet in existence on any topic of English law." F. POLLOCK, PRINCIPLES OF 
CONTRACT: BEING A TREATISE ON THE GENERAL PRINCIPLES CONCERNING THE VALIDITY 
OF AGREEMENTS IN THE LAW OF ENGLAND xi (3d ed. 1881). 
40. A Canadian reviewer wrote that "to the frequently repeated assertion that Anson on 
Contracts is the best book on the subject, I am still constrained to say, 'Possibly, but what a 
distressingly humiliating confession!'" Ewart, Book Review, 33 HARV. L. REV. 626, 629 (1920). 
There were also, of course, less influential American works that appeared during this time. 
One of these was F. HILLARD, THE LA w OF CONTRACTS (1872), a two-volume work by a writer 
of treatises on various subjects. Another was J. BISHOP, THE DOCTRINES OF THE LA w OF CON-
TRACTS (1878), in which the author, also a treatise writer, endeavored in less than 300 pages "to 
present the body of the law of contracts, without its bloat, in form to be examined and reexam-
ined, by old and young, the learned and the unlearned." Id. at iii. This work was superseded by 
a much larger-one is tempted to say bloated-work entitled COMMENTARIES ON THE LAW 
OF CONTRACTS (1887), which had a second edition in 1907 by M. Early. And the employment at 
will doctrine, also known as "Wood's rule," had its origins in H. WOOD, A TREATISE ON THE 
LAW OF MASTER AND SERVANT§ 134, at 272 (1877). See also J. POMEROY, A TREATISE ON 
THE SPECIFIC PERFORMANCE OF CONTRACTS (1879) (a one-volume work that had subsequent 
editions in 1897 and 1926). 
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that the beginning of the Age of Anthology heralded a burgeoning of 
contracts scholarship in America. Moreover the decade had been an 
important one for legal scholarship in other fields as well. 41 Yet the 
delivery of Holmes' lectures in 1880 was followed by nearly forty lean 
years. It was as if Langdell and Holmes, along with Anson and Pol-
lock, had said all that was worth saying on the subject of contract law. 
Not until the publication of Williston's treatise in 1920 was there an 
event to rival those of the period 1871-1880.42 
Indeed, though law teaching may have entered the Age of Anthol-
ogy in 1871 with the publication of Langdell's casebook, no competi-
tor in the field of contracts appeared for two decades. Then, in 1891, 
William Albert Keener published a strange amalgam of two English 
works. 43 The cases were taken from those used by Gerard Brown 
Finch, an Englishman who, inspired by Langdell, had edited a collec-
tion of English contracts cases in an unsuccessful attempt to introduce 
the case method in England. 44 Since only one of Finch's cases was 
American, only one of Keener's was.45 Keener interspersed Finch's 
cases among text from Stephen Martin Leake, the best of the early 
English writers on contract law.46 
It appears that Keener needed a contracts casebook in a hurry. A 
chaired professor at Harvard and a gifted practitioner of the case 
method,47 he had been lured away by Columbia in 1890.48 His arrival 
at a school led by Theodore Dwight, who had raised the lecture 
method to a high art, produced a paroxysm like the one that had ear-
41. "The year 1872 was remarkable for a group oftaw books of prime importance •••• In 
the next two years came three books of value •... The year 1876 was fruitful in important works 
, •.. " C. WARREN, A HISTORY OF THE AMERICAN BAR 551-52 (1911). 
42. Gilmore's "Age of Faith" encompassed both the beginning of the age of anthology and 
the lean years, running "roughly from the Civil War to World War I." G. GILMORE, THE AGES 
OF AMERICAN LAW 41 (1977). Schlegel writes of the growth of American legal education dur-
ing a period whose "outside parameters are 1870 and 1921." Schlegel, Between the Harvard 
Founders and the American Legal Realists: The Prof essionalization of the American Law Profes-
sor, 35 J. LEGAL Eouc. 311, 317 (1985). 
43. W. KEENER, SELECTIONS FROM LEAKE'S ELEMENTS OF THE LAW OF CONTRACTS AND 
FINCH'S CASES ON CONTRACTS (1891). 
44. G. FINCH, A SELECTION OF CASES ON THE ENGLISH LAW OF CONTRACT (1886). 
45. Eliason v. Henshaw, 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 225 (1819) (offer sent from Harper's Ferry ask-
ing for acceptance "by return of wagon" was not accepted by response sent to Georgetown, 
though received there by offeror). See W. KEENER, supra note 43, at 153. 
46. Woodruff characterized Leake as "the earliest of the satisfactory elementary works on 
the modern law of contracts." Woodruff, Book Review, 5 CORNELL L.Q. 222, 222 (1920). For 
more on Leake, see note 35 supra. 
47. Keener, though still in his thirties, already had a two-volume casebook on quasi-
contracts to his credit. w. KEENER, A SELECTION OF CASES ON THE LAW OF QUASI-CON-
TRACTS (1888-89). 
48. For varying accounts of the circumstances, see A HISTORY OF THE SCHOOL OF LAW, 
COLUMBIA UNIVERSITY 118-19 (1955); 2 c. WARREN, supra note 1, at 444; s. WILLISTON, 
supra note 28, at 130. 
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lier seized Harvard.49 When Dwight and his followers left Columbia 
in 1891, Keener replaced him, becoming dean of the school and pro-
fessor in the course in contracts, a course with no casebook other than 
Langdell's. He later rationalized his borrowing from Finch and Leake 
by explaining that "to plunge a beginner ... into a mass of conflicting 
authorities, must produce great confusion of thought, resulting in dis-
couragement ... and causing a loss of valuable time."50 Nevertheless, 
he abandoned his experiment with unseemly haste and in 1898 pub-
lished another two-volume casebook on contracts containing nearly 
470 cases that filled over 1800 pages.51 The cases were not taken from 
a previous collection and had no introductory text that would prevent 
"confusion of thought." A brief preface makes no mention of his ex-
periment with the earlier casebook. 
Before Keener's second effort, there had already appeared another 
casebook remarkable for its selection of cases. In 1894 Ernest W. 
Huff cut of Cornell, who in the following year was to publish an Amer-
ican edition of Anson, 52 had teamed with Edwin Hamlin Woodruff of 
Stanford and later Cornell to produce a one-volume casebook that 
contained only American cases, English cases having been omitted be-
cause of "the limits of a single volume" and because "excellent collec-
tions of English cases are already available."53 The nearly 240 cases 
filled 700 pages and were organized along the lines of Anson's text. 
The casebook went through a fourth edition in 1925. 
In the meantime, Langdell's Cases did not go untended. In 1894, 
Samuel Williston, who had begun teaching contracts at Harvard in 
1890, in the wake of Keener's departure, added under his own name 
the second volume that Langdell had never gotten to, with just over 
150 cases in some 600 pages.54 He expanded Langdell's chapter on 
conditions, added new chapters on impossibility, illegality, joint obli-
gations, discharge, and assignment, and included some new cases 
bringing Langdell's volume up to date. Then in 1903 and 1904, Willis-
ton, acknowledging his debt to Langdell, brought out again under his 
own name a two-volume casebook containing some 460 cases in nearly 
1400 pages.55 He added a hint of an authorial presence by noting that 
"to cover the subject fairly in two volumes of reasonable size, I have 
been obliged frequently to shorten the reports of cases."56 The invisi-
49. 2 C. WARREN, supra note 1, at 502-03. 
50. Keener, Methods of Legal Instruction, 1 YALE L.J. 143, 148-49 (1892). In his first year at 
Columbia, Keener taught equity jurisdiction and real estate in addition to quasi-contracts. 
51. w. KEENER, A SELECTION OF CASES ON THE LAW OF CoNTRACTS (1898). A one-
volume revision was published in 1914 by Wormser and Loughran. 
52. See text at note 64 infra. 
53. E. HUFFCUT & E. WOODRUFF, AMERICAN CASES ON CONTRACT iii (1894). 
54. 2 S. WILLISTON, A SELECTION OF CASES ON THE LAW OF CONTRACTS (1894). 
55. S. WILLISTON, A SELECTION OF CASES ON THE LAW OF CONTRACTS (1903-1904). 
56. Id. at iii. John Chipman Gray had used no Jess than six volumes for his cases on prop-
1416 Michigan Law Review [Vol. 85:1406 
ble hand of the anthologist was already at work. 
In 1892 Clarence Degrand Ashley of New York University pub-
lished a slender volume, mixing cases with condensed cases and 
problems, for use at his school. 57 But like the few other casebooks 
that appeared during this period,58 it is of little interest today. 
While this may have been the Age of Anthology, it was not the 
Age of the Treatise. The most serious new work in the tradition of 
Story and Parsons was a three-volume treatise published in 1905 by 
William Herbert Page, of Ohio State and later of Wisconsin.59 
Although it may have been, as one reviewer put it, a "successfulO at-
tempt to delve into every crevice of contract law,"60 it was uncritical 
and unimaginative.61 It had a second edition in 1920-192262 but never 
gained the popularity of the author's similar work on wills. 63 
During these lean years, many leading writers contented them-
selves with the preparation of new editions of established works, par-
ticularly English ones. Gustaves H. Wald of Cincinnati did American 
editions of Pollock's text in 1881and1885. Jerome Cyril Knowlton of 
the University of Michigan did an American edition of Anson in 1887, 
and Huffcut added two more in 1895 and 1906. Williston produced a 
revision of Parsons in 189364 and an American edition of Wald's Pol-
erty. J. GRAY, SELECT CASES AND OTHER AUTHORITIES ON THE LAW OF PROPERTY (1888· 
1892). 
57. C. AsHLEY, CONTRACTS: EXTRACTS, CITATIONS, CONDENSED CASES AND STATE· 
MENTS (1892). There was a second edition in 1899 and a third and much larger edition in 1912. 
58. See E. HOPKINS, SELECTED CASES ON THE LAW OF CONTRACTS (1896) (arranged with 
reference to Clark's handbook). For a collection of digests from Williston's and Keener's 
casebooks, see c. HELM, A TREATMENT OF THE FUNDAMENTAL PRINCIPLES OF THE LAW OF 
CONTRACTS (1914). See also E. DUTTON, PRINCIPLES AND CASES ON THE LAW OF CON· 
TRACTS (1915), a slender volume with introductory text for each subject. 
59. W. PAGE, THE LAW OF CoNTRACTS (1905). Page later served as an adviser for the 
Restatement of Contracts. An earlier two-volume work by a treatise writer is F. WHARTON, A 
COMMENTARY ON THE LAW OF CONTRACTS (1882). 
60. Book Review, 15 YALE L.J. 108, 108 (1905). 
61. See Book Review, 6 COLUM. L. REv. 129, 130 (1906) ("rarely does more than reproduce 
the reasoning given in the cases"); Book Review, 19 HARV. L. REV. 312, 312 (1906) ("neither a 
first-class digest nor a first-class treatise"). 
62. It filled seven volumes, but the reviews did not improve. See Gardner, Book Review, 43 
HARV. L. REv. 984, 985 (1930) ("the book does not become more thoughtful as it expands"). 
63. W. PAGE, A CONCISE TREATISE ON THE LAW OF WILLS (1901). Later editions appeared 
in 1926, 1941, and 1960-1965, expanding the original single volume to eight. 
64. The preface noted that "the text with slight exceptions remains unchanged from the last 
edition." T. PARSONS, THE LAW OF CONTRACTS vii (S. Williston 8th ed. 1893). One reviewer 
noted that the revision had been "very conservatively done." Book Review, 8 HARV. L. REV. 65, 
65 (1894). Another, less charitably, was "much disappointed to find that Professor Williston has 
failed even more signally than did his predecessor. He seems to have regarded the text, as it fell 
from the pen of Professor Parsons, as something too sacred to be either altered, amended, or 
repealed." Book Notice, 3 YALE L.J. 105, 106 (1894). Williston later wrote that in addition to 
supplementing his income with the honorarium provided by Parsons' estate, he hoped to have 
"in a smaller way" the sort of distinction that Holmes had gained by editing Kent's Commenta-
ries. S. WILLISTON, supra note 28, at 136-37. 
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lock in 1906.65 Corbin did the first of his three American editions of 
the already popular Anson in 1919. With the exception of a few addi-
tions by Williston to Pollock and by Corbin to Anson, these works 
produced no scholarship of lasting interest. 66 Their dependence on the 
leading casebooks is evident from Corbin's wry comment that Willis-
ton's Pollock 
may be used with great convenience in connection with Professor Willis-
ton's recent collection of cases on contracts, the notes in which fre-
quently appear bodily in the new edition of Pollock, and the cases 
printed therein at length [in most chapters] being very largely the ones 
discussed and criticised by Pollock in the text and by the American edi-
tors in the notes. 67 
This was not a time for serious treatise writers, like Story and Par-
sons, who had written primarily for practitioners. With the coming of 
the Age of Anthology, the day had dawned for a new form of discur-
sive legal prose - the student handbook. Lawrence Friedman writes, 
with some hyperbole, that "Langdell drove the textbooks and treatises 
out of the temple of legal education."68 But if the temple was - at 
least ultimately - emptied of "textbooks and treatises" in the sense of 
Story's and Parsons', it was then crammed with student handbooks. It 
is one of the ironies of the introduction of the case method of instruc-
tion that its spread brought the proliferation of texts contrived to un-
lock its mysteries. The rapidly developing student market craved 
student handbooks to accompany the anthologies. 69 
One of the better of these was a small volume by Edward Avery 
Harriman of Northwestern, which appeared in 1896 and was "in-
tended especially for the use of students."70 To this end it included 
65. In the main, the American additions appear as footnotes, many of which were updated 
by Wald before his death in 1902. Williston added text on third party beneficiaries and discharge, 
much of which had already appeared in law review articles. Corbin offered the backhanded com-
pliment that there was "no other treatment of the subject open to so few objections as is this." 
Corbin, Book Review, 15 YALE L.J. 310, 310 (1906). 
66. Woodruff wrote that since Corbin was "so admirably equipped for writing a book of his 
own on the principles of contracts ..• it appears to be an unwarranted expenditure of effort for 
him to gloss secondarily the work of another, even if it be so well established a treatise as that of 
Anson." Woodruff, supra note 46, at 222. Another reviewer of Corbin's Anson noted that An-
son's treatment of third party beneficiaries and conditions being less satisfactory than that of 
other topics, there was ample justification for Corbin's edition, which added material on these 
subjects. Arant, supra note 39, at 134. 
67. Corbin, supra note 65, at 311. Williston later admitted that he was encouraged to think 
he could "produce a valuable edition without great delay" by the circumstance that he had just 
brought out a "liberally annotated" edition of his casebook. S. WILLISTON, supra note 28, at 262; 
see also C. HELM, supra note 58 (containing digests of cases from Williston's and Keener's 
casebooks). 
68. L. FRIEDMAN, A HISTORY OF AMERICAN LAW 624 (2d ed. 1985). 
69. On the expanding market, see R. STEVENS, LAW SCHOOL: LEGAL EDUCATION IN 
AMERICA FROM THE 1850s TO THE 1980s, at 73-84 (1983). 
70. E. HARRIMAN, ELEMENTS OF THE LAW OF CONTRACTS viii (1896). The book covered 
its subject in just over 300 pages. Citations were to Langdell and Williston and to Huffcut & 
Woodruff. When a second and larger edition appeared in 1901 it added citations to Keener. 
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indications of where cases cited were found in the leading casebooks of 
the day. Ashley published a similar work in 1911, over half of which 
consisted of a single chapter on formation. 71 Although he protested 
that his aim was not "to prepare a text solely for the use of students," 
but rather to "aid the efforts being made to place the law on a more 
philosophic and satisfactory basis,"72 it was no mere coincidence that 
Ashley's text appeared only a year before the revised and enlarged 
edition of his casebook. 73 In the same year George Purcell Costigan, 
then of Northwestern and later of Stanford, published a slender vol-
ume dealing with performance of contracts, noting that its purpose 
was "assisting students to understand a troublesome part of the law of 
Contracts."74 Whatever their popularity with students, none of these 
texts achieved the scholarly respectability of their famous forerunner, 
the Summary, that had sprung from what Ashley called "the master 
mind of C.C. Langdell."75 
Scholarly respectability was not, however, the goal. As the case 
method spread and as, by the beginning of the century, law schools 
grew in number to roughly 120 and student enrollment soared to over 
14,000,76 it became apparent that this was a market in which money 
was to be made. The production of student handbooks by authors 
who lacked the academic credentials of Ashley, Costigan, or Harri-
man, bid fair to become a cottage industry. 77 One of the first of these 
books was a "hand-book" on contracts by William Lawrence Clark, 78 
an author of texts on a variety of subjects who later attained an 
unenviable immortality in the field of contracts when his suit against 
his publisher produced a notable dictum by the New York Court of 
Appeals on Clark's lack of sobriety.79 Replete with blackletter state-
ments of principles, Clark's handbook made "no attempt to be original 
for the mere sake of originality" - nor, it seems, for any other 
71. C. AsHLEY, THE LAW OF CONTRACTS (1911). 
72. Id. at vii. 
73. See note 57 supra. 
74. G. COSTIGAN, THE PERFORMANCE OF CONTRACTS iii (1911). The book was a revised 
and enlarged version of Costigan, Conditions in Contracts, 7 COLUM. L. REV. 151 (1907). 
75. C. AsHLEY, supra note 71, at viii (quoting an earlier edition of his casebook). Ashley, 
incidentally, was a Columbia, not a Harvard, graduate. 
76. See Huffcut, A Decade of Progress in Legal Education, 25 REP. A.B.A. 529, 530 (1902). 
77. It has been estimated that a thousand or so legal treatises were published in the last half 
of the nineteenth century. See L. FRIEDMAN, supra note 68, at 624. 
78. w. CLARK, HANO-BOOK OF THE LAW OF CONTRACTS (1894). In its nearly 800 pages it 
cited almost 10,000 cases. Id. at iii. 
79. Clark v. West, 193 N.Y. 349, 86 N.E. 1 (1908). Clark was to get $2 per page for a three· 
volume work on corporations, plus an additional $4 per page if he abstained from liquor. In 
holding that West had waived the condition, the court said, "It is not a contract to write books in 
order that the plaintiff shall keep sober, but a contract containing a stipulation that he shall keep 
sober so that he may write satisfactory books." 193 N.Y. at 357, 86 N.E. at 3-4. The case still 
finds favor in several casebooks. 
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cause. so A deluge of similar works testifies to their commercial poten-
tiality. 81 There was thus no shortage of writing about contract law. 
The difference was that it was largely oriented toward students and no 
longer toward the bar. 
Toward the end of the nineteenth century, h!Jwever, a distinctive 
new outlet for legal scholarship emerged, the student-edited university 
law review. The Harvard Law Review appeared in 1887, the Yale Law 
Journal in 1891, the Columbia Law Review in 1900, and the Michigan 
Law Review in 1902. In 1896 the University of Pennsylvania Law De-
partment took over the American Law Register. By 1920 the number 
of such publications was approaching twenty. 
Leading American writers on contracts were quick to take advan-
tage of the opportunity offered by the law reviews. A compilation in 
1931, under the auspices of the Association of American Law Schools, 
of selected readings on contracts gives a rough idea of the use of law 
reviews by writers in that field. 82 The names of Corbin, Williston, 
Ashley, and Ames are prominent in the years before 1920,83 yet the 
total number of articles by American authors in that period is only 
slightly larger than the number published in the single decade of the 
1920s.84 Moreover, many of the articles that appeared during the lean 
years were brief and of narrow compass, as if inspired by classroom 
discussions of casebook cases. 85 By and large, the lean years for con-
80. W. CLARK, supra note 78, at iii. In justice to Clark, it should be added that one reviewer 
wrote that in spite of this "modest disclaimer of originality, Mr. Clark shows that he has not been 
content to follow the loose statements of either books or cases." Book Notice, 4 YALE L.J. 126, 
126 (1895). 
81. Other texts include G. ARCHER, THE LAW OF CoNTRACTS (1916); W. BRANTLY, LAW 
OF CONTRACT (1893); J. HARE, THE LAW OF CoNTRACTS (1887); J. LAWSON, THE PRINCIPLES 
OF THE AMERICAN LAW OF CoNTRACTS AT LAW AND EQUITY (1893); H. WILLS, PRINCIPLES 
OF THE LAW OF CONTRACTS (1909); see also R. RALSTON, THE PRINCIPLES OF THE LAW RE-
LATING TO THE DISCHARGE OF CONTRACTS (1886). As for the difficulties that the anthologists 
had in finding publishers for casebooks where "no publisher was willing to risk publishing more 
than a few isolated volumes," see Schlegel, Between the Harvard Founders and the American 
Legal Realists: The Professionalizati'on of the American Law Professor, 35 J. LEGAL EDUC. 311, 
317 (1985). 
82. SELECTED READINGS ON THE LAW OF CoNTRACTS (1931). The committee that com-
piled and edited the volume consisted of George J. Thompson of Cornell (Chairman), George K. 
Gardner of Harvard, George W. Goble of Illinois, and James M. Landis of Harvard. They were 
able to include enough articles that it is difficult to think of obvious candidates that they omitted. 
That they were not infallible is suggested by the omission of Isaacs, The Standardizing of Con-
tracts, 27 YALE L.J. 34, 40 (1917) ("there has clearly been a long-enduring tendency in English 
faw from status to contract, and - in the last two generations - an equally distinct veering back 
to status"). They also omitted Costigan's article on conditions. See note 74 supra. But there is 
no indication that they favored the new at the expense of the old. 
83. For some of Corbin's contributions, see note 170 infra. 
84. I have ignored book reviews and student notes, all of which were after 1920. The slight 
difference in favor of the period prior to 1920 disappears if Williston, whose output was predomi-
nantly before 1920, is eliminated. 
85. See, e.g., Burnham, Arbitration as a Condition Precedent, 11 HARV. L. REV. 234 (1897), a 
fifteen-page article in good part on the English case of Scott v. Avery, a case used by Williston in 
1894, and its subsequent history in England and the United States. See also G. WHITE, TORT 
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tract scholarship on the shelves of the law libraries were reflected in 
the pages of the law reviews. It was a sign of dependence on antholo-
gies when Keener, writing about the specific performance of contracts 
in the inaugural issue of the Columbia Law Review, expressed regret 
"that circumstances, beyond his control, have compelled [the author] 
to confine the citation of cases almost exclusively to those found in his 
Cases on Equity Jurisdiction."86 
D. Why the Lean Years? 
Why were there so many lean years of contracts scholarship be-
tween the delivery of Holmes' lectures in 1880 and the publication of 
Williston's treatise in 1920? What happened to contracts scholarship 
after 1880? 
I believe that the most plausible explanation for the lean years lies 
in the conditions of law teaching that followed the introduction of the 
case method. Professors who lectured had to organize and describe. 
In every set of lecture notes was the germ of a legal treatise. 87 After 
the revolution in law teaching inspired by Langdell, professors taught 
from cases and could seek refuge in the Socratic method to avoid or-
ganization and description. 88 We can surmise this from anecdotes of 
how the method was practiced by its legendary masters, from the nar-
row focus of many of the early law review articles, and from the alpha-
betical organization of Langdell's Summary. As Simpson has pointed 
out, with the case method there came "a need for a type of literature 
that generations of American academics have spent their energies in 
producing."89 And as another English academic, William Twining, 
has observed, the "judgment of history may well be that, for all its 
virtues, the American casebook tradition has been a major brake on 
progress in American law schools, by absorbing energies which might 
otherwise have been more fruitfully employed."90 Not only did the 
LAW IN AMERICA: AN INTELLECTUAL HISTORY 34-35 (1980), describing articles in the early 
volumes of the Harvard Law Review in the form of comments on cases. 
86. Keener, The Burden of Loss as an Incident of the Right to the Specific Performance of a 
Contract, 1 CoLUM. L. REV. 1, 1 (1901). 
87. Even before Langdell, however, Jaw professors did not always lecture. Lawrence Fried-
man describes the method used at Harvard during its "dark age" prior to 1870 as the "text-book 
method," in which assigned portions of a textbook were studied and then recited on. L. FRIED· 
MAN, supra note 68, at 610. 
88. In 1902, Huffcut reported that 12 schools had completely adopted the case method, 34 
had not done so at all, and 48 had some mixture. Most of the prominent law schools were among 
the first to convert to the case method. Huffcut, supra note 76, at 541; see also L. FRIEDMAN, 
supra note 68, at 616-17. 
89. Simpson, supra note 35, at 677. Simpson admits, however, that since the great American 
treatises came after Langdell's time, in the long run "there is no sense in which Langdell's ideas 
can be said to have destroyed the treatise." Id. 
90. w. TWINING, KARL LLEWELLYN AND THE REALIST MOVEMENT 57 (1973). Twining 
adds that "to the outsider it seems to stretch ordinary usage to include this activity under 're-
search.' " A hostile reviewer of the second edition of Langdell's Cases complained that such 
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coming of the Age of Anthology absorb the energies of contracts 
teachers, but it diverted their attention from the world of the bar to 
that of the law student, a student who was generally both less well 
educated and less carefully selected than the student of today. In do-
ing this, it changed the nature of contracts scholarship in important 
ways. 
Before the Age of Anthology, what was taught about contract law 
reflected what was written about it. During the Age the reverse was 
true: what was written about contract law reflected what was taught 
about it. The anthologies became the grist in the teacher's scholarly 
mill. Langdell's Summary is a prime example, for it was truly a prod-
uct of his teaching. Its analysis was abstract and theoretical because 
his teaching was abstract and theoretical. It made heavy use of Eng-
lish cases because his teaching made heavy use of English cases. This 
tendency of scholarship to mirror teaching had two particularly dele-
terious effects on scholarship. 
The first of these was superficiality. It would be a mistake to over-
estimate the extent to which the use of anthologies was intended to 
stimulate the student's critical faculties. If the student whom Langdell 
asked to state the facts in his first case, Payne v. Cave, 9 1 had perused 
the rather extraordinary outline that served as an "index" to the first 
edition of Langdell's Cases, he would have found the rule of that case 
under the heading "bidding at auction." For it was there recorded in 
the index that bidding is "a mere offer, and revocable until the ham-
mer falls," citing to Payne v. Cave on page one. A student who had 
the advantage of the Summary that accompanied Langdell's second 
edition could find more: 
It was decided in Payne v. Cave that a bid at an auction is in the nature 
of an offer, which is accepted by knocking down the hammer; and per-
haps it is too late to question the correctness of the decision. On princi-
ple, however, it is open to much doubt.92 -
Thus no sooner had the anthology been introduced than means were 
wanted to lessen the rigors that it inflicted, and much energy was 
channeled into providing those means. Users of Langdell's Cases had 
Langdell's Summary and Harriman's cross references, which also 
served for Keener's casebook. Users of Huffcut and Woodruff's 
casebook had Huffcut's Anson. Users of Ashley's casebook had 
books "are not to be named in comparison with any of the books which have been written by the 
previous Dane professors oflaw in Harvard University," i.e., the elder Story and Parsons. Book 
Review, supra note 21, at 873. 
91. See 2 C. WARREN, supra note 1, at 372. 
92. C. LANGDELL, SUMMARY, supra note 19, § 19 (footnote deleted). Langdell went on to 
argue that putting goods up for auction was an offer and the bid was therefore an acceptance, 
creating a contract with the condition that no one else shall bid higher. Another indication that 
Langdell's commitment to his own method was not as firm as has generally been supposed is that 
with increasing age and failing eyesight, he abandoned the method and stated and analyzed the 
cases himself. See 2 C. WARREN, supra note 1, at 458. 
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Ashley's text. There were also, of course, student texts unrelated to 
any casebook.93 · 
The tendency of scholarship to mirror teaching produced a second 
deleterious effect on contracts scholarship by severely confining its 
scope. As long as law professors wrote for a student audience about 
what they taught in their courses, their writing would range no more 
widely than the curriculum allowed. And during the lean years, the 
parol evidence rule, damages, specific performance, and restitution 
were all taught in separate courses and not in the course in contracts. 
The tyranny of the curriculum thus imposed a powerful restraint upon 
the scholarly activities of contracts teachers, channeling much of that 
activity into discussion of consideration and of offer and acceptance. 
In spite of the inhibiting effects of the anthologies, a few excep-
tional treatises appeared during the lean years, but in fields other than 
contracts. Thus the spread of the case method did not prevent John 
Henry Wigmore, who brought the method to Northwestern, from 
publishing his monumental treatise on evidence in 1904-1905.94 Nor 
did it stop Keener from publishing his treatise on quasi-contracts in 
1893 nor Frederic Campbell Woodward of Stanford from publishing 
his treatise on the same subject in 1913.95 But the years from 1881 to 
World War I seem also to have been lean ones in most fields. Charles 
Warren noted that compared to earlier years, "[t]he twenty years from 
1880 to 1900 were less fruitful of great works,"96 and Lawrence Fried-
man wrote that "the treatises after 1870 seemed somewhat drier and 
less imaginative than the best work of the prior generation."97 This 
confirms the suspicion that, despite the growth of Langdell's practice 
of hiring full-time academics rather than lawyers and judges, the 
spread of Langdell's own case method is in good part to be blamed for 
the lean years. This is not, however, to say that it was the only cause. 
The lean -years may have been due in part to the conditions of 
American society as the Golden Age drew to a close in the late nine-
teenth century. Henry Steele Commager called the decade of the 
93. See text at notes 70·81 supra. For a casebook written to go with a text, see note 58 supra 
(on Hopkins and Clark). 
94. For a description of Wigmore's "great zeal for the case method," see W. RoALFE, JOHN 
HENRY WIGMORE: SCHOLAR AND REFORMER 35 (1977). 
95. John Norton Pomeroy's three-volume A Treatise on Equity Jurisprudence was published 
in 1881-1883, but the work must have been done largely in the seventies. On Pomeroy's method 
of teaching, see J. HuRsr, note 15 supra. 
96. C. WARREN, supra note 41, at 554. 
97. L. FRIEDMAN, supra note 68, at 625. I have not attempted to survey fields other than 
contracts. For discussion of John Chipman Gray's THE NATURE AND SOURCES OF THE LAW 
(1909) and Roscoe Pound's contemporary law review writing, see Golding, Jurisprudence and 
Legal Philosophy in Twentieth-Century America - Major Themes and Developments, 36 J, 
LEGAL EDUC. 441, 446-48 (1986). For discussion of works on corporate law, largely by practi-
tioners, see Horwitz, Santa Clara Revisited: The Development of Corporate Theory, 88 W. VA. L. 
REV. 173 (1985). For discussion of torts, see G. WHITE, supra note 85, at 20-62. 
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1890s "the watershed of American history," separating "an America 
on the whole self-confident, self-contained, self-reliant, and conscious 
of its unique character and of a unique destiny" from "the modem 
America . . . troubled with the problems that had long been thought 
peculiar to the Old World; experiencing profound changes . . and try-
ing to accommodate its traditional institutions and habits of thought 
to conditions new and in part alien. "98 Beginning roughly in the mid-
eighties Americans were "for the first time ... confronted with a chal-
lenge to their philosophical assumptions."99 James Willard Hurst de-
scribed a similar watershed in American law. He called the years 
1800-1875 "above all else, the years of contract in our law." At the 
end of this period there was a shift from "a pattern of surprisingly 
deliberate and self-conscious policy .. that law should increase men's 
liberty by enlarging their practical range of options" to "an unpat-
temed ... drift and default of policy, through which the legal order 
profoundly affected the accumulation and control of capital and thus 
contributed to creating a new challenge ... to liberty."too 
The scholarship of Story, Parsons, and Langdell was surely better 
suited to an orderly universe with unity, harmony, and familiarity 
than to a universe beset with instability, ferment, and discord. Was 
confidence in a mechanical, descriptive, and abstract approach so 
shaken that contracts scholarship lay dormant for nearly four de-
cades? Were the practitioners of this approach unable to adapt to a 
new and more challenging intellectual climate? In a time that inspired 
Henry Adams, William James, and Thorstein Veblen, was there no 
inspiration for contracts scholars?101 
Some of the explanation for the lean years may lie on a purely 
personal level. George Knowles Gardner of Harvard suggested this 
when he wrote in 1937 that "the faith of Ames and Keener could not, 
in their time, raise up a prophet comparable to the great teacher [Wil-
liston] who for five decades has spread the faith of Savigny, Pollock, 
98. H. COMMAGER, THE AMERICAN MIND: AN INTERPRETATION OF AMERICAN 
THOUGHT AND CHARACTER SINCE THE 1880's 41 (1950). 
99. Id. at 43. Howard Mumford Jones describes the period from the inauguration of Hayes 
in 1877 until the sinking of the battleship Maine in 1898 as "a period probably as tension-ridden 
as any other quarter of a century in our national history and certainly the most ominous era since 
the close of the Civil War," and says that the period from 1865 to 1915 "seldom exhibited more 
distressing traits of irrational disorder than it did in the 1890s, years in which the conflicts some-
times seemed uncontrollable." H. JONES, THE AGE OF ENERGY: VARIETIES OF AMERICAN 
EXPERIENCE 1865-1915, at 338, 387 (1971). 
100. J. HURST, LAW AND THE CONDITIONS OF FREEDOM IN THE NINETEENTH-CENTURY 
UNITED STATES 18, 53 (1956). 
101. For a suggestion that this was so, see G. WHITE, supra note 85, at 23, 26 (emphasis 
deleted), explaining that one assumption of "a revolution in the process of acquiring and convey-
ing knowledge" that occurred in the late nineteenth century was "that knowledge was neither 
finite nor fixed in content," and pointing out that though "Langdell's perception oflegal science 
was revolutionary in the methods of acquiring knowledge it espoused," it was "static in the 
dogmatic orthodoxy it adhered to." 
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and Langdell."102 After Langdell there was only Williston at 
Harvard, and he was beset with illness and preoccupied with sales law 
until nearly the end of the first decade of this century .103 Corbin did 
not arrive at Yale until 1903.104 Is it possible that contracts scholar-
ship waited nearly forty years for Williston to mature and for Corbin 
to become established because there were no competitors of their stat-
ure? Columbia's Keener, whose scholarly production in contracts was 
largely limited to casebooks, was succeeded in 1902 by Charles Thad-
deus Terry, whose consummate skill in the classroom was not coupled 
with a scholarly bent. 105 Few other schools could attract persons of 
outstanding ability and offer them the time and resources to be pro-
ductive scholars. If Harriman, Huffcut, and Ashley were exceptions, 
their energies must have been drained by preparing casebooks and stu-
dent texts. 
E. The Years of Revival: World War 1-1930 
Whatever the explanation of the lean years, at last a revival came. 
As a student of American history has written, "Everybody knows that 
at some point in the twentieth century America went through a cul-
tural revolution. . . . Most people place the dividing line at the end of 
the First World War."106 Although it is difficult to pinpoint the begin-
ning of the revolution in contract law and it is plain that the first stir-
rings were earlier, the publication in 1920 of Williston's "magisterial" 
four-volume treatise107 surely signaled the end of the lean years. 
When the decade of the twenties opened, Williston, about to turn 
102. Gardner, Book Review, 51 HARV. L. REV. 188, 189 (1937). Gardner was lamenting the 
emphasis on promise as opposed to "the sense of indebtedness for past cooperation" as a basis for 
contractual obligation. 
103. Williston's treatise on sales was published in 1909. The Uniform Sales Act, which he 
drafted, was promulgated in 1906. A second edition of his casebook on sales appeared in 1905. 
Williston, who had been plagued by illness during this time, had a dramatic improvement in his 
health in 1912. See S. WILLISTON, supra note 28, at 163. 
104. See W. TwINING, supra note 90, at 27-29 (describing Corbin's concern with overcoming 
"the inadequacies of the Yale system" that confronted him when he joined that faculty). 
105. Terry continued to practice while he taught and was active in the National Conference 
of Commissioners on Uniform State Laws, of which he became president. See A HISTORY OF 
THE SCHOOL OF LAW, COLUMBIA UNIVERSITY, supra note 48, at 192-97. His principal contri-
bution to contracts scholarship in a period of over two decades seems to have been his book 
review ofWilliston's treatise, which appears in 34 HARV. L. REV. 891 (1921). It was not until 
Terry's departure and the arrival of Herman Oliphant in the early 1920s that Columbia again 
had a scholar in the field of contracts. Oliphant, however, also worked in trade regulation. 
106. H. MAY, THE END OF AMERICAN INNOCENCE: A STUDY OF THE FIRST YEARS OF 
OUR OWN TIME 1912-1917 at ix (1959). 
107. s. WILLISTON, THE LAW OF CONTRACTS (1920). The word "magisterial" is Gilmore's, 
who described Corbin's as "even greater." G. GILMORE, supra note 4, at 6. For a less flattering 
assessment, see L. FRIEDMAN, supra note 68, at 626, 692 ("from the standpoint of legal or social 
thought, volume after volume of a heavy void"; "volume after volume, solid, closely knit, fully 
armored against the intrusion of any ethical, economic, or social notions whatsoever"). 
Whatever one's assessment, the treatise was not improved in later editions. 
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sixty, had been teaching for thirty years. Corbin, in his late forties, 
had been teaching for nearly twenty years. Indeed, if we are to believe 
Grant Gilmore, the "main lines" of Corbin's six-volume treatise, 108 
"the greatest law book ever written[,] ... had no doubt been thrown 
down by 1920,"109 though it was not published until 1950. The ap-
pearance of Corbin's Anson in 1919 suggests that Corbin had at least 
thought through many of the hard questions of organization and scope 
that confront a treatise writer. If the preparation of casebooks di-
verted these two giants from more serious pursuits, it also gave them a 
chance to try out some of the ideas needed in a treatise. 
By the end of the twenties Williston and Corbin and their contem-
poraries had already accomplished more than had been accomplished 
during all of the lean years. It was during the twenties that the Re-
statement of Contracts - "one of the great legal accomplishments of 
all time"110 -was largely written. 111 It was during this time that lead-
ing academics in the field of contracts sought to reassert their influence 
over the bar. In his 1929 lectures at Virginia, Williston recalled that 
Lord Coke had thought it " 'the part of a good judge to magnify his 
office' " and likened professors to judges in this regard. "So I make no 
apology for taking an enlarged view of the office of those who have 
followed the same occupation as my own."112 The pace of production 
of casebooks also quickened. Into a world that for half a century had 
known at most three casebooks of consequence (Langdell & Williston, 
Keener, and Hujfcut & Woodruff), there suddenly burst two more in 
1921, quickly followed by a new edition of Williston's casebook in 
1922. 
In 1921, Corbin published his contracts casebook, a single volume 
containing almost 600 cases and filling nearly 1500 pages. It was to 
have two more editions, the last in 1947.113 In the same year Costigan, 
then at Northwestern, published a competing book, also a single vol-
ume with more than 500 cases in over 1450 pages. 114 Its life was ex-
tended for decades when it was taken over by Harold Shepherd of 
108. A. CORBIN, CORBIN ON CONTRACTS (1950-1951). 
109. G. GILMORE, supra note 4, at 57-58. 
110. Id. at 59. 
111. See RESTATEMENT OF CONTRACTS ix (1932). Begun in 1923, it was almost finished by 
the end of the decade, though it bears the publication date of 1932. In 1928 a revision of the first 
177 sections was published as a preliminary official draft. Id. at x. 
112. S. WILLISTON, supra note 13, at 107. He went on: "Teachers of law exercise their 
influence on its development in two ways. First, by the direct influence of their teaching on their 
pupils, and, second, by their writings." Id. at 107-08. Williston himself also exercised his influ-
ence through the American Law Institute and the National Conference of Commissioners on 
Uniform State Law. 
113. A. CORBIN, CASES ON THE LAW OF CONTRACTS (1921). 
114. G. COSTIGAN, CASES ON THE LA w OF CONTRACTS (1921). There was a second edition 
in 1932 and a third edition in 1934, the year of Costigan's death. 
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Cincinnati and later Duke and Stanford.115 The year 1922 saw the 
publication of the second edition of Williston's casebook. By eliminat-
ing what one reviewer described as "elaborate footnotes" and cutting 
down on the statute of frauds, Williston managed to add "upwards of 
sixty new cases"116 - a total of over 400 in just over 1050 pages. 
Williston succeeded in staying within a single volume - an important 
step in the face of the single-volume anthologies of Corbin and 
Costigan. 117 
The production of books and the efforts at restating did not deter 
scholars from writing law review articles, which appeared in increas-
ing numbers and became more ambitious in scope, some plainly in-
spired by the activity of restating. 118 The number of law school law 
reviews, short of a score at the start of the decade, more than doubled 
by decade's end. 
F. The End of the Age: 1930-World War II 
As the Age of Anthology progressed, virtually every entering law 
student came to learn contracts from a casebook.119 Before the Age 
began, a professor's reliance on Parsons or Story might give his lec-
tures some similarity to those of his colleagues. 120 With the introduc-
tion of the case method, the casebook itself became the common 
denominator of legal instruction. The editors of the leading casebooks 
were in a position to determine to a large extent what would be taught 
in American law schools. 
In contrast to the casebook market today, with a score of compet-
ing works vying for adoption, during the first half century of the Age 
of the Anthology the number of leading casebooks was severely lim-
ited. For two decades, Langdell's casebook had no peer at all. It had 
no real rival until 1898, when Keener's two-volume second effort ap-
peared. Williston responded with his two volumes in 1903. When, 
115. Shepherd published a revision of Costigan's third edition in 1939, second and third 
editions without Costigan's name in 1946 and 1952, and a fourth edition with Harry H. Welling-
ton of Yale in 1957. 
116. Arnram, Book Review, 70 U. PA. L. REv. 373, 373 (1922). 
117. In addition to the three casebooks discussed, Frederick Adams Whitney of St. John's 
published LEADING CASES ON THE LAW OF CONTRACTS (1926), a collection emphasizing New 
York cases. 
118. Thus the Restatement inspired a heated debate between Whittier and Corbin. See Whit-
tier, The Restatement of Contracts Again, 15 IOWA L. REV. 278 (1930), which answered Corbin, 
The Restatement of the Common Law by the American Law Institute, 15 IOWA L. REV. 19 
(1929), which responded to Whittier, The Restatement of Contracts and Mutual Assent, 17 CA· 
LIF. L. REV. 441 (1929). See also Whittier, The Restatement of Contracts and Consideration, 18 
CALIF. L. REV. 611 (1930). During this period Corbin wrote most of his six influential articles on 
third party beneficiaries, described by Anthony Waters as "The Campaign of 1918-1930." Wa-
ters, The Property in the Promise: A Study of the Third Party Beneficiary Rule, 98 HARV. L. 
REv. 1109, 1150 (1985) (emphasis deleted). 
119. See note 88 supra and sources cited therein. 
120. For a description of pre-Langdell Harvard, see note 87 supra. 
April-May 1987) Contract Anthologies 1427 
nearly two decades later, casebooks by Corbin and Costigan were pub-
lished in 1921, Herman Oliphant of Columbia rejoiced that teachers of 
contracts, "fortunate in having a choice between two such excellent 
classroom tools as the case-books of Professors Williston and Keener," 
now had two more to choose from, 121 and Grover Cleveland Grismore 
of Michigan exulted that the "teacher of Contracts has an imposing 
array from which to choose."122 
With serious treatise writing in a decline and law reviews in their 
infancy, the editing of casebooks and of related student texts was, if 
not the only game in town, a particularly attractive one. It was also a 
game limited, by present-day standards, to very few players - not 
more than three or four serious contenders from 1870 to 1930. This 
oligopoly did not begin to break down until the 1930s. Although Wil-
liston's third edition in 1930 was declared by one reviewer to be "most 
assuredly the best collection of cases on Contracts now published,"123 
and Costigan's second edition in 1932 was deemed by another to be 
"the best case book ever published on the subject of contracts,"124 
other academics nevertheless dared to enter the lists. 
Grismore was the first, in 1931, to invade what he admitted was "a 
field in which the handiwork of masters is already available."125 Har-
old C. Havighurst of Northwestern followed in 1934,126 as did Page in 
1935.127 The year 1935 also saw the publication by Edwin Wilhite 
Patterson of Columbia of an unwieldy but influential two-volume 
work, designed to be used with a third volume not yet prepared, in an 
eight-hour course in contracts.128 The third volume, by George Wash-
ington Goble of Illinois, appeared in 1937,129 and, in 1941, the three 
volumes were compressed into the single volume by Patterson and Go-
121. Oliphant, Book Review, 16 ILL. L. REV. 645, 645 (1922); see also Book Review, 8 VA. 
L. REV. 315, 315-16 (1922) ("There have been so many casebooks on Contracts put upon the 
market that the question is constantly being raised as to which one is to be used .... "). 
122. Grismore, Book Review, 20 MICH. L. REv. 373, 374 (1922). 
123. Hildebrand, Book Review, 17 CoRNELL L.Q. 319, 322 (1932). 
124. Goble, Book Review, 27 ILL. L. REv. 592 (1933). 
125. G. GRISMORE, CASES ON THE LAW OF CONTRACTS iii (1931). A second edition ap-
peared in 1946. 
126. H. HAVIGHURST, A SELECTION OF CONTRACT CASES AND RELATED QUASI-
CONTRACT CASES (1934). There was a second edition in 1950. 
127. W. PAGE, CASES AND READINGS ON THE LAW OF CONTRACTS (1935). 
128. E. PATIERSON, CASES AND MATERIALS ON CoNTRACTS II (1935). The first volume 
was entitled "Performance of Contracts" and the second "Rescission, Reformation, and Quasi 
Contracts." At the time, an eight-hour course in contracts was not a novelty, for Page's 
casebook was also designed for such a course. See W. PAGE, supra note 127, at iii. 
129. G. GOBLE, CASES AND MATERIALS ON CONTRACTS I (1937). Earlier it had been writ-
ten that Karl Nickerson Llewellyn of Columbia, whose casebook on sales had appeared in 1930, 
was expected to do the third volume. Reeve, Book Review, 22 VA. L. REV. 843, 844 (1936). 
(Since the styles of Llewellyn and Patterson were like oil and water, I have tried to verify this, 
but without success. Three of Patterson's former student assistants have no recollection of plans 
to include Llewellyn. However, the library of the Columbia School of Law contains a nine-page 
mimeographed "Introduction to Contracts" written by Llewellyn for his 1933-1934 class.) 
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ble that was to become the best seller in its field.I30 In 1938, George 
Knowles Gardner of Harvard brought out his casebook on 
contracts. I3I 
The pace of casebook publication picked up after the Second 
World War, with books by Lon L. Fuller of Harvard in 1947,132 by 
Addison Mueller of Yale and later UCLA in 1951,133 and by Friedrich 
Kessler of Yale and Malcolm Pitman Sharp of Chicago in 1953.134 
Enough competitors have followed that there are now about a score on 
a market that is vastly greater than the market on which Corbin, Cos-
tigan, and Williston competed in the 1920s.I35 One can rightly say, as 
did Isaac Maurice Wormser of Fordham back in 1950, "There are 
now so many good casebooks on the subject of Contracts that there is 
truly an embarrassment of riches."I36 Certainly the oligopoly has van-
ished. And just as certainly, in competition with the outpouring of 
law review articles and of university-press books and even the writing 
of treatises, the preparation of casebooks is no longer the dominant 
force that it once was. I37 
130. E. PATIERSON & G. GOBLE, CASES ON CONTRACTS (2d ed. 1941). There was a third 
edition in 1949 and a fourth edition, with Harry Willmer Jones, in 1957. (A reviewer of the third 
edition noted that because the 1941 book was designated a "second edition[,] •• it fell victim to 
the tyranny of labels and was ignored by the book reviewers." Levin, Book Review, 44 ILL. L. 
REV. 739, 739 (1949).) Subsequent editions in 1965, 1972, and 1980 bear the names of Edward 
Allan Farnsworth and William Franklin Young and, in 1965 and 1972, of Jones. 
131. G. GARDNER, A SELECTION OF CASES AND MATERIALS ON THE LAW OF CONTRACTS 
(1938). 
132. L. FULLER, BASIC CONTRACT LAW (1947), described as "probably the first post-realist 
contracts text." Klare, Book Review, 54 N.Y.U. L. REV. 876, 882 (1979). There have been 
subsequent editions with Robert Braucher in 1964 and with Melvin Aron Eisenberg in 1972 and 
1981. 
133. A. MUELLER, CONTRACT IN CONTEXT (1951). A successor, much changed, appeared 
in 1971 under the name Contract Law and Its Application, with Arthur I. Rosett as coauthor. It 
had a second edition in 1977 and a third, with Gerald P. Lopez, in 1983. 
134. F. KESSLER & M. SHARP, CONTRACTS: CASES AND MATERIALS (1953). Later edi-
tions have dropped Sharp's name and added Grant Gilmore in 1970 and Anthony T. Kronman 
in 1986. 
135. Here is what I believe to be a complete list of commercially published casebooks since 
the Second World War. Citations are to the most recent editions, with former authors in brack-
ets. ANDERSON (1950); CALAMARI & PERILLO (2d ed. 1977); CLOSEN, FERBER, PERLMU1TER 
& WEINBERG (1980); CoRBIN (3d ed. 1947); CRANDALL & WHALEY (1987); DAWSON, HARVEY 
& HENDERSON (4th ed. 1982); FARNSWORTH & YOUNG [Patterson, Goble, Jones] (2d ed. 1980); 
FESSLER & Lo!SEAUX (1982); FREEDMAN (1973); FULLER & EISENBERG [Braucher] (4th ed. 
1981); HAMILTON, RAU & WEINTRAUB (1984); JACKSON & BOLLINGER (2d ed. 1980); KESS-
LER, GILMORE & KRONMAN [Sharp] (3d ed. 1986); KNAPP & CRYSTAL (1986); MACNEIL (2d 
ed. 1978); McGOVERN & LAWRENCE (1986); MUELLER, ROSE1T & LOPEZ (3d ed. 1983); MUR-
PHY & SPEIDEL (3d ed. 1984); MURRAY (3d ed. 1983); REITZ (1975); SHEPHERD & WELLING-
TON [Costigan] (4th ed. 1957); SIMPSON (1956); SUMMERS & HILLMAN (1987); VERNON (1980); 
WILLISTON & LAUBE [Langdell] (6th ed. 1954). In two instances (McGovern and Mueller), ear-
lier casebooks have not been listed though they might be regarded as distinct because their later 
casebooks are not held out as later "editions." 
136. Wormser, Book Review, 3 J. LEGAL EDUC. 145, 147 (1950). 
137. In addition to the treatises of Corbin and Williston, there are three one-volume texts, 
aimed at lawyers and judges as well as at students, by Calamari & Perillo, Farnsworth, and 
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Furthermore, as the pace of publication quickened, the nature of 
the casebook was transformed from the pristine "gathering of flowers" 
that Langdell had brought forth in 1871 to something quite different. 
Thus, in reviewing Kessler and Sharp, Benjamin Kaplan reported that 
"far from being a neutral anthology" it was "rather a rich critique of 
the law of contracts" in which "the editors wear their heart on their 
sleeve."138 In an expanding market, casebook editors made overt at-
tempts to achieve product differentiation. The Age of the Anthology 
had ended. 
For roughly eighty years, however, a small number of contracts 
scholars whose names graced the spines of casebooks had enjoyed an 
unparalleled opportunity to shape the thinking of virtually every 
American lawyer. In Part II of this article I turn to how those early 
anthologists used that opportunity to exert an influence on the scope 
of their subject, on its organization, on the precedents that came to be 
"leading cases," and on contract doctrine. 
II. THE INFLUENCE OF THE ANTHOLOGISTS 
A. On Scope 
How did the early anthologists help to define the scope of their 
subject? For the most part, their contributions were limited to exclu-
sions. A present-day reader of one of these early anthologies is thus 
struck not by what is to be found but by what is missing. 
A patient reader of the early treatises of Story and Parsons could 
have found something on most of the topics now included in books on 
contract law. The early treatises dealt with such general topics as con-
sideration, mutual assent, capacity, fraud, illegality, the statute of 
frauds, interpretation and construction (including the parol evidence 
rule), performance and breach, assignments, discharge, and damages. 
The most notable omissions were specific performance and restitution. 
To find all these general topics, however, one had to pick one's way 
through seemingly endless discussions of such specific types of con-
tracts as, to borrow Gilmore's catalog, those "of factors, brokers, auc-
tioneers, executors and administrators, trustees, seamen, corporations, 
guardian and ward, masters of ships, guarantors, landlord and tenant 
- and on and on in a never-ending list."139 
Murray, and one aimed primarily at lawyers by_ Hunter. Authors of university-press books on 
contracts include Dawson (two), Fried, Gilmore, Havighurst, and Macneil. In a sense, we have 
come full-circle since Holmes. 
138. Kaplan, Book Review, 63 YALE L.J. 1039, 1039 (1954). It may have been a sign of the 
times that published in the same year was H. HART & H. WECHSLER, THE FEDERAL COURTS 
AND THE FEDERAL SYSTEM (1953), described by a reviewer as "so much more than a casebook 
should pretend to be" as to justify description as "the definitive text on the subject." Kurland, 
Book Review, 67 HARV. L. REV. 906, 906-07 (1954). 
139. G. GILMORE, supra note 23, at 45. 
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The anthologists made two kinds of exclusions. First, they omitted 
many of the general topics that had been covered by the treatise writ-
ers but which were dealt with in other law school courses. Second, 
they declined to treat the many specific contracts of which the treatise 
writers were so fond. 
Langdell's Cases was, as he admitted, of limited scope. It only be-
gan the subject of contracts, embracing no more than the general top-
ics of mutual assent, consideration, and conditional contracts. The 
last of these contained cases on what we would now call constructive 
conditions of exchange, including Kingston v. Preston and Boone v. 
Eyre. But it omitted Hochster v. de la Tour, decided in 1853, because 
the chapter did not cover anticipatory repudiation, and it left out Tay-
lor v. Caldwell, decided in 1863, because the chapter did not deal with 
impossibility. It was Langdell's expectation that his initial casebook 
would "be followed by other volumes upon the same plan,"140 but no 
such volume appeared until Williston produced his in 1894. 
Even with Williston's additions, the scope of the two volumes was 
still limited. Williston included Hochster v. de la Tour but not Taylor 
v. Caldwell Though he did not deal with third-party beneficiaries as 
such, he added Lawrence v. Fox, decided in 1859, to Langdell's section 
on "From Whom the Consideration Must Move." But he still omitted 
Hadley v. Baxendale, decided in 1854, because he had nothing on 
damages, Lumley v. Wagner, decided in 1852, because he had nothing 
on specific performance, and Britton v. Turner, decided in 1834, be-
cause he had nothing on restitution. He also had nothing on the stat-
ute of frauds or on the defenses of mistake, misrepresentation, or 
duress. 
Keener's 1898 anthology was broader in scope. He put Lawrence 
v. Fox in a separate section on third-party beneficiaries, had a separate 
chapter on duress, and included Hadley v. Baxendale in a chapter on 
contract remedies. But this chapter did not include equitable reme-
dies, and he had nothing on the equitable defenses of mistake and mis-
representation and nothing on the statute of frauds or restitution. 
Of the leading nineteenth-century anthologies, the most extensive 
in scope was that of Huffcut and Woodward. They had, with minor 
exceptions, simply followed Anson. In addition to what was in the 
other two casebooks, they had a chapter on capacity, a chapter on the 
"reality of consent" that included mistake, misrepresentation, and du-
ress, a section on the statute of frauds, a section on remedies that in-
cluded not only damages but specific performance and injunction, and 
a chapter on rules of evidence related to interpretation. There was still 
nothing on restitution. 
Startling as most of these omissions may seem to the contemporary 
140. c. LANGDELL, CASES, supra note 15, at vii. 
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reader, they were largely beyond the control of the anthologists. They 
were due to the tyranny of the curriculum. 141 The exclusionary effect 
of the curriculum was notable in four areas. First, the course in equity 
subsumed defective consent, particularly mistake and misrepresenta-
tion. Second, the courses in damages and equity claimed remedies, 
notably damages for breach of contract and specific performance, re-
spectively. Third, the course in quasi-contracts dealt with restitution. 
Fourth, the course in evidence covered the parol evidence rule. 
As late as Corbin's and Costigan's 1921 editions and Williston's 
1922 edition, none of the above topics was included. There was still no 
Sherwood v. Walker on mistake, no Laidlaw v. Organ on misrepresen-
tation, no Hadley v. Baxendale on damages, no Lumley v. Wagner on 
specific performance, no Britton v. Turner on restitution, no Pym v. 
Campbell on the parol evidence rule - simply because none of those 
topics was included in these leading casebooks. Keener had used Had-
ley v. Baxendale and Huffcut and Woodward had used Sherwood v. 
Walker and Laidlaw v. Organ, but these early anthologists had not 
influenced the leaders of the 1920s. The major influence for including 
defective consent, restitution, and the parol evidence rule - and at 
least a significant force in favor of adding damages - was Patterson's 
two-volume work which was not published until 1935, and then as a 
result of curricular reform. 142 For decades the tyranny of the curricu-
lum took a heavy toll of topics that were excluded from anthologies of 
contracts cases. 
This toll was reflected in turn in contracts scholarship. Contracts 
teachers naturally tended to write about the topics that were touched 
on in the anthologies from which they taught. Thus questions of con-
sideration and mutual assent, which bulked large in the anthologies, 
141. That a narrow view of the scope of contract law was not peculiar to casebook editors 
can be seen from a glance at the scope note for contracts in the century edition of the American 
Digest, which digested American cases to 1896. Among the topics excluded are capacity, illegal-
ity, statutes of frauds, parol evidence, damages, specific performance, and assignments. All of 
these exclusions have persisted through the latest Decennial Digest, the ninth. 
142. Mulder, Book Review, 36 COLUM. L. REv. 342, 344 (1936) (describing as a "welcome 
innovation" Patterson's "more than cursory treatment of the Paro! Evidence Rule"); Reeve, 
supra note 129, at 845 (describing as a "distinct advantage" Patterson's "bringing together of 
Contracts, Quasi-Contracts ... and Damages"); see also Levin, supra note 130, at 739 (describing 
as a "distinctive feature" of the 1941 edition of Patterson & Goble "the conception that a con-
tracts course should include substantial portions of the law of damages, quasi contracts and the 
parol evidence rule"). Havighurst's casebook, published the year before Patterson's, was entitled 
A Selection of Contract Cases and Related Quasi-Contract Cases, but it does not seem to have had 
the impact of Patterson's and did not, for example, include Britton v. Turner. Not everyone 
agreed as to the desirability of integration, even as late as 1950. See Wormser, supra note 136, at 
145 (doubting "the wisdom of teaching the Paro! Evidence Rule ... as it is taken up fully in the 
course on Evidence" and "of including cases on the measure of damages for breach of contract" 
since a "course on Damages ... is given in almost every law school"). The integration of reme-
dies was not an innovation of Patterson's. Grismore's 1931 casebook and Costigan's second 
edition in 1932 had chapters on damages that included, for example, Hadley v. Baxendale, and 
Havighurst's 1934 casebook included Lumley v. Wagner. Corbin's second edition in 1933 had a 
chapter on remedies that included both of those cases. 
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sparked endless debate. Because of the exclusions imposed by the cur-
riculum, remedial aspects of contract law, which were absent from the 
anthologies, received little attention from contracts scholars. 
Although specialists in remedies wrote about such matters, the divi-
sions of the curriculum discouraged any integrated analysis of the law 
of contracts and the law of remedies. It cannot be mere coincidence 
that the first significant discussions of damages measured by reliance 
rather than by expectation came during the decade of the thirties, 
when the subject of damages was, for the first time, generally taught as 
part of the contracts course.143 
While the early anthologists' exclusion of such general topics as 
remedies may be a cause for regret, few would shed tears over their 
exclusion of special contracts. Neither Langdell nor his successors 
emulated the early treatise writers in their devotion to these. Gilmore 
succumbed to hyperbole, however, in arguing that in the early books 
"general theoretical discussion - the consideration doctrine, the the-
ory of conditions, the requirement of mutual assent - was minimal 
or nonexistent" and in crediting Langdell with "the almost inadver-
tent discovery of the general theory of Contract."144 While Gilmore's 
statement may have been true for Kent and the elder Story, it was not 
true for the younger Story, for Parsons, or for other writers of treatises 
on contracts that would have been in Langdell's library.145 True, their 
works contained elaborate treatments of special contracts because, un-
like Langdell's, they were directed at practitioners rather than stu-
dents.146 But far from being mere collections of such treatments, these 
books contained full discussions of the general topics mentioned 
above. 
When Langdell consulted the 1856 fourth edition of Story's work 
on contracts, newly expanded to two volumes, he found not only dis-
cussion of many special branches of the law of contracts, but two 
chapters on mutual assent and consideration that filled over 120 
pages. 147 When he turned to the 1866 edition of Parsons' work, newly 
143. In addition to Fuller & Perdue, The Reliance Interest in Contract Damages (pts. 1 & 2), 
46 YALE L.J. 52, 373 (1936-1937), see the excerpt from Gardner, written in 1934, which appears 
at page 297 of Fuller's 1947 casebook (expressing the "Tort Idea .•. that one ought to pay for 
losses which others suffer in reliance on his promises"). 
144. G. GILMORE, supra note 23, at 45; G. GILMORE, supra note 4, at 12. Gilmore saw the 
law of contract before Langdell as conceived largely in terms of "the various specialties - nego-
tiable instruments, sales, insurance and so on." Id. at 11. 
145. Even the first volume of Nathan Dane's Abridgment, published in 1823, had 23 pages on 
consideration under the heading "Contracts and Consideration" and 13 pages on damages under 
another heading. Additional general discussion appeared in the discussion of debt in volume 5, 
published in 1824. 
146. Thus the advertisement in Story's second edition announced that the inclusion of 
"[m]any new branches of the subject of Contracts," such as the contracts of factors, brokers, 
seamen, and masters of ships, would "render it more valuable to the profession." W. STORY, A 
TREATISE ON THE LAW OF CONTRACTS NOT UNDER SEAL ix (2d ed. 1847). 
147. Similar observations could be made of American editions of English works. In the 1860 
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expanded to three volumes, which proclaimed the addition of new ma-
terial on special matters, 148 he found that it continued to treat many 
general matters, with some sixty pages on consideration and mutual 
assent149 and a remarkable development of the subject of perform-
ance.150 Among these general topics the emphasis was, to be sure, 
very different from what it is today. The authors stressed questions of 
formation and of validity, at the expense of interpretation and con-
struction and of performance. Thus, though the great case of Hochster 
v. de la Tour had been decided in 1853, it seems not to have aroused 
immediate interest among treatise writers on either side of the Atlan-
tic.151 And when formation and validity were discussed, much more 
attention was given to consideration, capacity, and the statute of 
frauds than to mutual assent. Though Adams v. Lindsel/ had been 
handed down in 1818, most of the leading English cases dealing with 
mutual assent in contracts by correspondence came too late even for 
inclusion in Langdell's first edition.152 
Some of the emphasis on general principles of contract law may 
have been unwilling as well as unwitting. Langdell himself planned 
further volumes, which might have dealt with special contracts.153 
And Williston noted with regret that to keep down the size of his 1894 
volume, he had omitted some "chapters of the law which, though per-
haps naturally included under the general title of the law of contracts, 
may be better taught by themselves or in connection with some other 
American edition of Chitty, a substantial part of the work was devoted to general contract law, 
including some 50 pages on consideration and mutual assent. J. CHITTY, A TREATISE ON THE 
LAW OF CoNTRACTS, AND UPON THE DEFENSES TO ACTIONS THEREON 8-60 (J.C. Perkins 10th 
Am. ed. 1860). The 1856 edition of Smith had almost 40 pages on consideration and mutual 
assent and devoted less than a quarter of its space to special contracts. J. SMITH, THE LA w OF 
CONTRACTS (4th Am. ed. 1856). 
148. These included contracts of shipping and of marine, fire, and life insurance. 1 T. PAR-
SONS, THE LAW OF CONTRACTS vii (5th ed. 1866). 
149. See id. at 425-85. Indeed, account being taken of size of page and print, Parsons' discus-
sion of "consideration" is nine-tenths as long as Langdell's. Even taking account of Parsons' 
inclusion of several pages on "failure of consideration," it is six-sevenths as long. 
150. It came in three fragments: an early discussion of a few pages on "failure of considera-
tion," a later chapter on "construction" and interpretation of contracts, and a section on per-
formance in the chapter on defenses. See id. at 462-66; 2 id. at 491-566, 636-75. 
151. It is not in Story's fourth edition (1856) nor in the sixth American edition of Smith's 
Leading Cases (1866). 
152. E.g., Tinn v. Hoffman & Co., 29 L.T.R. 271 (Ex. Ch. 1873); Household Fire & Carriage 
Accident Ins. Co. v. Grant, 4 Ex. D. 216 (C.A. 1879); Byrne & Co. v. Leon Van Tienhoven & 
Co., 5 C.P.D. 344 (1880); Henthorn v. Fraser [1892] 2 Ch. 27 (C.A.). Earlier American cases 
include Eliason v. Henshaw, 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 225 (1819) (discussed in note 45 supra); 
Mactier's Admrs. v. Frith, 6 Wend. 103 (N.Y. 1830). 
153. Langdell's agenda is reminiscent of Blackstone's: "[T]here arise three points to be con-
templated in all contracts; 1. The agreement: 2. The consideration: and 3. The thing to be done 
or omitted, or the different species of contracts." 2 W. BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES *442. If 
Langdell had expanded his treatment of the third of these, he might have dealt with "the differ-
ent species." · 
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title of the law."154 Among these were some of the specific types of 
contracts covered by the earlier treatises. Furthermore, the interest in 
general principles rather than specialized types of contracts may have 
been as much a product of the 1870s as of Langdell's own mind. Both 
Pollock's and Anson's books emphasized general principles, and 
Leake's, while oriented toward the practitioner, laid far more stress on 
general principles than did, for example, either Addison or Chitty. 
Nonetheless, though Langdell and the other early anthologists may 
not deserve credit for discovery of "the general theory of contract," 
they bear the main responsibility for the emphasis that we place today 
on general principles at the expense of special contracts. 
In view of the preoccupation of early treatise writers with special 
contracts, it is striking that none of the early anthologists thought to 
explore how general contract principles were applied in particular con-
texts. In contrast to the treatise writers, the anthologists conceived of 
contract law as generally applicable to all kinds of contracts, much as 
they conceived of it as applicable to all jurisdictions. Corbin wavered 
in 1921 when, in developing the subject of conditions, he devoted sepa-
rate subsections to "contracts of service," "certificate of architect or 
engineer," and "charter parties - leases."155 But it was Havighurst 
who in 1934 first constructed an entire contracts casebook by grouping 
cases "according to subject matter and not according to the doctrines 
employed," beginning with contracts for services and ending with con-
tracts for the sale of goods. 156 His experiment did not, however, sur-
vive his first edition, and the same fate befell Mueller's short-lived 
casebook centered on a contract for the construction of an apartment 
house. 157 The emphasis on general principles remained unshaken by 
these experiments. 
B. On Organization 
What did the early anthologists contribute to the organization of 
154. 2 S. WILLISTON, supra note 54, at v. It is suggestive that the index to his Cases listed, 
under conditions precedent: leases, policies of insurance, charter parties, building contracts, con-
tracts of apprenticeship, and sales of personal property. 
155. He deleted the last of these in 1933, but added others, including "installment contracts 
- land," "installment contracts - goods," and "installment contracts - labor and 
construction." 
156. Havighurst argued that this enabled "the student more easily to master the facts of a 
case and to see each situation as a living problem rather than as merely dead material for logical 
dissection." He acknowledged his debt to Dean Leon Green, "whose reclassification of tort cases 
suggested to me the desirability of a similar undertaking in the field of contracts." H. HAVIG· 
HURST, supra note 126, at iii, v. 
157. A. MUELLER, supra note 133. Later casebooks by Mueller are not listed as revisions of 
Mueller's original casebook. The latest, Mueller, Rosett & Lopez, ends with chapters on sale of 
goods, personal service contracts, and construction contracts. A. MUELLER, A. RosETI & G. 
LOPEZ, CONTRACT LAW AND ITS APPLICATION 649-933, chs. 5.7 {3d ed. 1983). 
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their subject? Questions of organization seem not to have caused 
much concern to nineteenth-century contracts scholars. 
The early American treatise writers were heavily influenced by 
their fascination with the particular and gave little attention to matters 
of organization. Thus a reader of the 1853 edition of Parsons encoun-
tered twenty-two chapters on "Parties to a Contract," including "Out-
laws, Persons Attainted, and Persons Excommunicated," before 
coming upon "Consideration and Assent." The reader then found 
twelve chapters on "The Subject-Matter of Contracts," ranging from 
sale of real and personal property to bailment and carriers before 
reaching such matters as interpretation and construction, defenses, 
and damages. 158 
For Langdell, organization posed no problem. Parsons' treatise, 
stripped of the chapters on parties and subject matter, had placed con-
sideration first, then mutual assent, and then - under interpretation 
and construction - conditions. Langdell's anthology simply followed 
this sequence. Langdell may have shared Parsons' lack of concern 
with organization, as the alphabetical scheme of his Summary 
suggests.159 
When Williston came to organizing his two volumes in 1903, he 
also began with formation, but then made a major innovation by turn-
ing to "parties affected by contracts." Here he grouped third-party 
beneficiaries, assignments, and joint obligations. He then went on to 
the statute of frauds, performance, illegality, and discharge. This early 
placement of third-party problems was plainly influenced by such trea-
tise writers as Parsons, who had placed his twenty-two chapters on 
parties near the beginning. It persisted in Williston's later editions, in 
his treatise, and in the Restatement of Contracts. 160 
The other early anthologists used a different plan for their 
casebooks. Huffcut and Woodruff in 1894 simply adopted Anson's 
chronological organization. They traced the development of the con-
tract from formation through discharge in four major parts: first, for-
mation of contracts; second, operation of contracts - including third-
party beneficiaries, assignments, and joint obligations;161 third, inter-
pretation of contracts; and fourth, discharge of contracts - including 
not only discharge by agreement, but also discharge by performance, 
by breach (including a few cases on remedies), and by impossibility. 
As Anson put it in his preface, "I have tried to show how a contract is 
made, what is needed to make it binding, what its effect is, how its 
158. See T. PARSONS, supra note 11. 
159. See note 20 supra. 
160. In Williston's fifth edition, the parol evidence rule and the statute of frauds were in-
serted before third-party problems, and in the sixth edition by Laube third-party problems were 
put even later. 
161. Anson did not include the topic of joint obligations. 
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terms are interpreted, and how it is discharged and comes to an 
end."162 Keener's 1898 casebook used a similar scheme, divided into 
three parts: first, formation of contracts; second, operation of con-
tracts - beginning with a chapter on third-party problems; and third, 
discharge of contracts - dealing with discharge not only by agree-
ment but also by impossibility, as well as with illegality and duress. 163 
Decades later, Corbin was to begin, much as Langdell had, with 
mutual assent, consideration, and conditional contracts, and then go 
on to matters relating to performance, including impossibility. He 
then took up discharge, and only then third-party problems, followed 
by illegality and finally the statute of frauds. 164 Placing third-party 
problems so near the end was a sharp departure from the tradition 
borrowed by Williston from Parsons - a departure that was to find 
favor among modem casebook editions and in the second Restate-
ment. But since Corbin, like Langdell and Williston, had nothing on 
remedies, he was spared the most vexing problem that now faces edi-
tors of contracts casebooks - where to locate that topic. 
For those of the early anthologists who did deal with remedies, the 
location of the topic seems to have been a subject of some embarrass-
ment. Huffcut and Woodruff relegated remedies - as did Anson -
to a section in a chapter on discharge by breach, in their part on dis-
charge of contracts. Keener devoted a whole chapter to remedies in his 
part on operation of contracts. Remedies then dropped from sight un-
til the 1930s because of the organization of the curriculum. In 1933, 
when Corbin added a chapter on remedies to his second edition, he 
located it in the middle, after breach and before discharge. In 1941, 
Patterson and Goble did much the same, placing remedies in the mid-
dle after the statute of frauds and before failure of conditions. It re-
mained for Fuller in 1947 to take the bold step of putting remedies up 
front under the heading "the general scope of the legal protection ac-
corded contracts."165 Karl Klare has written that this signalled a cen-
162. W. ANsoN, supra note 38, at v. 
163. See W. KEENER, supra note 51. Keener's 1891 casebook, based on Finch & Leake, had 
proceeded from formation to capacity, mistake, fraud, and duress, and then to illegality, to dis· 
charge - including discharge by performance and breach as well as by agreement - and then to 
damages, and finally to assignment. See W. KEENER, supra note 43. 
164. See Whittier, Book Review, 31 YALE L.J. 220, 220 (1921) ("There is no attempt to 
follow the order of Anson on Contract which the author has recently edited."); see also Hopkins, 
Book Review, 2 U. TORONTO L.J. 191, 191 (1937) (noting that Patterson "freely admits that [his] 
order of treatment does violence to the amalgam of logic and chronology (associated with Sir 
William Anson) which has thus far governed the compilation of contracts case-books"). 
165. L. FULLER, supra note 132, at 1. The first to put remedies at the beginning of a 
casebook, however, was Patterson, who did so in his incomplete set of volumes published in 
1935. 
Professor Patterson starts his book in Volume 1 with a novel idea which may well, in the 
practical proof of class room teaching, have great value, namely, to preface conditions with 
some 80 odd pages of cases on damages which must impress forcibly upon the students that 
what the plaintiff recovers in the normal law suit on a contract is a judgment for money 
damages. 
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tral message of the legal realist: "[l]t is impossible to understand the 
nature of legal rights and relationships or to logically deduce remedial 
conclusions from them without knowing what courts can and actually 
will do to and for litigants."166 This placement of remedies, together 
with its inevitable emphasis on the nature of the remedial interests that 
the law seeks to protect, has found favor with other casebook 
editors. 167 
But remedies aside, most contemporary contracts casebooks, 
though varying considerably in organization, still show the influence 
of the traditional chronological scheme of organization attributed to 
Anson, with the principal difference that third-party problems are 
often relegated to a place nearer the end.168 With the possible excep-
tion of third-party problems, casebook organization, including the lo-
cation of remedies, seems not to have had a dramatic effect on the 
organization of treatises or the second Restatement. 169 
C. On Precedents 
If the early anthologists in the field of contracts were to see their 
influence on that subject's scope checked by the curriculum and their 
influence on its organization only indifferently felt, they were to suffer 
no such disappointments with respect to their influence on precedents. 
The most popular of their cases, reused in anthology after anthology, 
were to become part of the taught tradition of American contract law, 
revered as "leading cases" by the many lawyers whose first acquain-
tance with the field came from reading those cases. Where did these 
early anthologists get their cases? The problem of case selection had a 
special urgency for Langdell and Keener, both of whom found them-
selves thrust into teaching contracts on short notice. 
Sometimes the cases came as a kind of by-product, as they did for 
Huffcut, who must have read all the cases in his all-American anthol-
ogy of 1894 while preparing his 1895 American edition of Anson. And 
Reeve, supra note 129, at 844. 
166. Klare, supra note 132, at 882. 
167. Notable for placing remedies first are Dawson, Harvey & Henderson and Jackson & 
Bollinger. See also Farnsworth & Young. However, in the latest edition of Fuller & Eisenberg the 
subject of remedies is now put off until the fourth chapter. 
168. One notable departure is that of Kessler and Sharp in 1953 who made a grand division 
between "Contract and the Free Enterprise System" and "Irregularity, Inequality, and Imperfect 
Competition" - highlighting two sections of the law of contracts "governed by principles which 
are inconsistent with if not diametrically opposed to each other." F. KESSLER & M. SHARP, 
supra note 134, at vii, viii, 2. This organization has been abandoned in the most recent edition 
and has not been followed by others. 
169. Contemporary casebooks show great variety in the organization of cases within a topic, 
though there is a tendency to begin a topic with an old and seminal case if one is used. Langdell 
carried the chronological method to an extreme. See note 4 supra and accompanying text. 
Neither Keener nor Huffcut and Woodward was so wedded to jurisdictional or chronological 
ordering, and their successors surely have not been. 
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a generation later, Corbin must have read all of the American and 
many of the English cases in his anthology of 1921 while editing his 
1919 American edition of Anson. 110 Williston published his 1894 vol-
ume just after his 1893 edition of Parsons, his 1903 edition not long 
before his 1906 American edition of Pollock, 171 and his 1922 edition 
shortly after his treatise appeared in 1920. And Williston wrote that it 
was Langdell's work as a student research assistant for Parsons172 that 
enabled Langdell "to prepare and publish with little delay" his 
cases, 173 though Langdell seems to have made at least as much use of 
Story's cases as of Parsons'. 174 
The anthologists often took cases from each other. The most ex-
treme example, of course, is Keener's hurried 1891 borrowing from 
Finch. 175 Williston's subsequent editions borrowed openly from Lang-
dell, and Shepherd later borrowed openly from Costigan. Other 
casebook editors, not formally connected with predecessors, acknowl-
edged similar debts. 176 And whether acknowledged or not, such debts 
will be inevitable as long as future editors teach from existing antholo-
gies. As Corbin admitted, "One cannot use a particular casebook in 
his law school courses for more than 15 years without being greatly 
influenced by both the choice of cases and the order of their arrange-
ment. "177 It is surely more than mere coincidence that so many edi-
tors of subsequent casebooks undertook to review the works of their 
170. Corbin also produced a flurry of law review articles prior to the publication of his 
casebook, including four on offer and acceptance [23 YALE L.J. 641 (1914); 26 YALE L.J. 169 
(1917); 27 YALE L.J. 382 (1918); 29 YALE L.J. 767 (1920)], and one each on consideration [27 
YALE L.J. 362 (1918)], conditions [28 YALE L.J. 739 (1919)], third-party beneficiaries [27 YALE 
L.J. 1008 (1918)], and discharge [22 YALE L.J. 513 (1913)]. The chapter on conditions that he 
added to Anson was, for example, based largely on his 1919 article on that subject. 
171. Here, however, the edition of Pollock seems to have been the by-product. Williston later 
wrote that he was encouraged to do it because "I had just brought out for the use of my class in 
the Law School two volumes of selected cases on contracts, liberally annotated." S. WILLISTON, 
supra note 28, at 262. 
172. Id. at 136; see also Danzig, The Death of Contract and the Life of the Profession: Obser-
vations on the Intellectual State of Legal Academia, 29 STAN. L. REV. 1125, 1130-31 (1977). 
173. S. WILLISTON, supra note 28, at 136. Parsons acknowledged in his preface his debt to 
"Mr. C.C. Langdell, now, Librarian of our Law School." 1 T. PARSONS, supra note 11, at x. 
President Eliot of Harvard later recalled that while a student he "heard a young man who was 
making notes to Parsons on Contracts talk about law." Address by President Charles W. Eliot, 
Harvard Law School Association dinner (Nov. 5, 1886), quoted in 2 C. WARREN, supra note 1, at 
360. 
174. At least in the area picked by Danzig, supra note 172, Langdell's cases correlate better 
with Story's citations than with Parsons'. 
175. W. KEENER, supra note 43. 
176. See, e.g., G. GARDNER, supra note 131, at vii (acknowledging, among others, Corbin, 
Costigan, Patterson, and Goble, "whose case books have brought to my attention many of the 
cases printed here"). 
177. A. CORBIN, supra note 113, at x. But Amram, supra note 116, at 373, said only about a 
quarter of Corbin's cases came from old casebooks. Whittier, supra note 164, at 221, said about 
three-fourths are cases not found in other books. 
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predecessors. 178 
The early anthologists' emphasis on English cases deserves special 
attention. Langdell's Cases was particularly noted for this. Of Lang-
dell's 336 cases, 310 were English, only twenty-two were American, 
and the remaining four came from other, mostly civil law, jurisdic-
tions. Of the American cases, two were from the Supreme Court of 
the United States, ten from Massachusetts, eight from New York, and 
one each from Connecticut and Pennsylvania.179 
Why did Langdell so skew his selection? Anglophilia, coupled 
with Eastern snobbery, was surely a factor. Langdell recalled his con-
tracts professor, Parsons, exhorting new students to study English de-
cisions diligently because "England governs us still~ not by reason of 
force but by force of reason." 180 This view must have guided Langdell 
when he helped Parsons with his treatise and again when he compiled 
an anthology of cases under pressure of time. 181 Since Langdell had 
forsaken a bookish practice in New York for an ivory tower in Massa-
chusetts, it was not surprising that he preferred American cases from 
those states. He was, of course, not alone in this. Early casebooks by 
his Harvard colleagues in other fields showed much the same parochi-
alism, 182 and, as late as 1950, Wormser, one of Keener's revisors, 
confessed to an "old-fashioned fondness for the leading English, Mas-
sachusetts, and New York cases."183 
Langdell's emphasis on English cases also served another end. Ac-
cording to Gilmore, the "apparent unity of doctrine" was "immensely 
178. Thus Dawson, whose casebook appeared in 1959, reviewed Kessler & Sharp in 6 J. 
LEGAL EDUC. 405 (1954); while Sharp, whose casebook appeared in 1953, reviewed Fuller in 15 
U. CHI. L. REV. 795 (1948); and Shepherd, whose casebook appeared in a second edition in 
1946, also reviewed Fuller in 1 J. LEGAL EDUC. 151 (1948). Gardner, whose casebook appeared 
in 1939, reviewed both Goble in 51 HARV. L. REv. 188 (1937) and Patterson's two volumes in 45 
YALE L.J. 1153 (1936); while Goble, whose casebook appeared in 1937, reviewed Costigan's 
third edition in 27 ILL. L. REv. 592 (1933). Havighurst, whose casebook appeared in 1934, also 
reviewed Costigan's third edition along with Patterson's two volumes in 21 low AL. REv. 661 
(1936); and Grismore, whose casebook appeared in 1931, reviewed both Corbin and Costigan in 
20 MICH. L. REV. 373 (1922). 
179. In Langdell's second edition he dropped the Pennsylvania case. Gilmore, however, was 
incorrect in asserting that aside from New York and Massachusetts "no other American jurisdic-
tions [were] represented." G. GILMORE, supra note 4, at 13. According to Williston, Langdell's 
"methods of selection were such that his case books never had wide circulation away from Cam-
bridge." S. WILLISTON, supra note 28, at 74. If this is so, Williston was himself responsible for 
the preparation of the materials first compiled by Langdell. 
180. 2 C. WARREN, supra note 1, at 312. 
181. Langdell's anglophilia may also have been due to failing eyesight. According to Willis-
ton, "Partly owing to an inability to use his eyes to any considerable extent, an infirmity which 
overtook him before he had been teaching in Cambridge many years, he had little interest or 
sympathy with any development of law later than 1850." S. WILLISTON, supra note 13, at 114. 
182. The heavy emphasis on English cases was continued, in somewhat differing degrees, by 
Ames in his two volumes of cases on bills and notes in 1881, by Gray in his six volumes of cases 
on property in 1888-1892, and by Keener in his two volumes of cases on quasi-contracts in 1888-
1889. All of these authors were more catholic than Langdell in their tastes for American cases. 
183. Wormser, supra note 136, at 145. 
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facilitated by the custom, initiated by Langdell, of relying to an ex-
traordinary degree on English cases as authoritative precedents."184 
Langdell's view of law "as a science,"185 led him to assume that "the 
cases which are useful and necessary" to finding the fundamental prin-
ciples that he sought "bear an exceedingly small proportion to all that 
have been reported."186 As Gilmore wrote, "We need not accuse 
Langdell and his successors of an unbecoming Anglophilism; for the 
structure they wanted to build, the English cases were the best - in-
deed the only possible - building materials."187 In 1823, Nathan 
Dane had written in the introduction to his Abridgment that the "evil 
to be feared in our country is, that so many sovereign legislatures, and 
so many Supreme courts, will produce too much law, and in too great 
a variety."188 With profits from this enormously successful work, 
Dane endowed a professorship at the Harvard Law School that was 
occupied by Parsons and then by Langdell. Langdell was surely aware 
that his benefactor believed that, in Hurst's words, a "university law 
school should be a school in the Anglo-American legal tradition, and 
not the voice of a parochial sovereign." In this, Hurst conceded, 
"Langdell's approach set an ideal of generous sweep."189 
Langdell's approach was not unopposed. Huffcut and Woodruff 
offered an alternative with their all-American anthology. In 1907, 
Albert Martin Kales, of the Illinois bar and sometime of Northwest-
ern, proposed a different alternative consisting of casebooks "com-
posed as far as practicable of cases from [a] particular jurisdiction, 
with the end to present an accurate exposition of the law in force at 
the present day, in that jurisdiction."190 Neither of these proposed al-
ternatives offered a serious challenge to Langdell's approach. 
The real challenge to the dominance of English cases was to come 
from another quarter. The establishment in 1923 of the American 
184. G. GILMORE, supra note 4, at 55. 
185. C. LANGDELL, CASES, supra note 15, at vi. This was not a novel view in his time. See 
Simpson, supra note 35, at 671-74; see also G. WHITE, supra note 85, at 20-62. In 1826, Joseph 
Chitty wrote in the preface to what may be the world's most durable lawbook of "the high 
importance of extracting from the decisions . . . the true principles upon which they are 
founded." J. CHITIY, A PRACTICAL TREATISE ON THE LAW OF CONTRACTS, NOT UNDER 
SEAL; AND UPON THE USUAL DEFENSES TO ACTIONS THEREON vii (1827). 
186. c. LANGDELL, CASES, supra note 15, at vi. 
187. G. GILMORE, supra note 4, at 55-56. 
188. 1 N. DANE, A GENERAL ABRIDGMENT AND DIGEST OF AMERICAN LAW xiv (1823). 
A ninth volume was added to the original eight in 1829. 
189. J. HURST, supra note 15, at 265. 
190. Kales, The Next Step in the Evolution of the Casebook, 21 HARV. L. REV. 92, 92 (1907). 
Kales complained that "the Harvard Law School case-book ..• does not purport to give an 
accurate and detailed picture of the law of any single American jurisdiction" and that "English 
law ... is the only single system that is minutely examined." Id. at 93. Kales, who worked 
primarily in the field of real property, had already published a text on future interests in Illinois. 
He subsequently edited several casebooks, none of which followed the suggestion in his article. 
For a casebook emphasizing New York cases, see note 117 supra. 
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Law Institute marked the beginning of an ambitious attempt to formu-
late rules that would be representative of American common law. The 
resulting Restatement of Contracts proved a formidable competitor to 
the English cases so prized by the early anthologists. In his second 
edition in 1933, Corbin cautioned students that the Restatement "can-
not be swallowed like an oyster," but explained his "constant refer-
ences" to it as an "aid in the process of analysis and generalization."191 
For Corbin, the Restatement must have served the end of giving some 
"apparent unity of doctrine," much as English cases had done for 
Langdell. The Restatement still does this today, and it may be in sig-
nificant part responsible for the declining influence of English cases. 
A few simple statistics show this decline. While more than 90% of 
Langdell's cases were English, just over 40% of the cases in Williston's 
companion volume of 1894 were English, a comparison that may be 
slightly misleading because nearly 30% of Langdell's space was de-
voted to consideration, a topic in which English cases have always 
been prominent. Keener's two volumes in 1898 had just over 50% of 
their cases from England; Williston's two volumes in 1903 had just 
under 50%. In Corbin's and Costigan's 1921 editions, only about 
30% of the cases were English, but in Williston's 1922 edition, some 
40% were English.192 After the appearance of the Restatement, the 
figure dropped to under 15% in Patterson and Gable's 1941 casebook, 
to 20% in Fuller's 1947 casebook, and to under 20% in Kessler and 
Sharp's 1953 casebook. Today's casebooks contain only a few old 
English cases from among the most durable: Adams v. Lindsell, Car-
lill v. Carbolic Smoke Ball Co., Dickinson v. Dodds, Hadley v. Bax-
endale, Hochster v. de la Tour, Kingston v. Preston, Rajjies v. 
Wichelhaus, and Taylor v. Caldwell 
With the increasing emphasis on American cases came greater use 
of recent cases. Of Langdell's small collection of American cases, 
fewer than 30% came from the twenty years prior to publication while 
the others came from the first half of the nineteenth century. Williston 
began in 1894 with a whopping 75% of his American cases from the 
previous twenty years, but this dropped to just below 55% in his 1903 
edition and plummeted to a mere 25% in his 1922 edition. Although 
the increasing span of years from which to choose cases may have 
contributed to this dramatic decline, it is difficult not to conclude that 
Williston developed a fascination with the familiar at the expense of 
the new and did not add many recent cases in his revisions. Of 
Huffcut and Woodruff's American cases of 1894, over 50% came 
from the previous twenty years, and for the American cases in 
Keener's 1898 casebook the figure was about 60%. It was also 60% 
191. A. CORBIN, CASES ON THE LAW OF CONTRACTS vi (2d ed. 1933). 
192. See Book Review, supra note 121, at 316, noting that over two-thirds of Corbin's cases 
were American. 
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for Corbin's 1921 edition, though Costigan's edition in the same year 
had only 40%.193 The proportion of American cases from the preced-
ing twenty years was well over 50% in Patterson & Goble, whose debt 
to Corbin is also evident in other ways.194 But it fell to less than 30% 
in Kessler & Sharp, and to well under 25% in Fuller, as editors had a 
longer span of time from which to choose their cases and looked with 
increasing interest to the historical development of American, as dis-
tinguished from English, law. 
By comparing the selection of cases one can get some insights into 
the extent to which casebook editors have been influenced by their 
predecessors. Because early contracts casebooks varied considerably 
in their scope, the comparisons here are limited to mutual assent and 
consideration, since these were included with more or less the same 
contours in all the casebooks beginning with Langdell.19s 
Which of the early anthologists exercised the greatest influence on 
their successors? And which of the modern casebooks was most influ-
enced by the early anthologists? The following figures compare the 
three early anthologies of Langdell, Keener, and Huffcut and Wood-
ruff, together with Corbin's and Williston's great anthologies of the 
twenties, against the three modern casebooks of Patterson and Goble, 
Fuller, and Kessler and Sharp.196 
Of Patterson and Goble's 142 cases on mutual assent and consider-
ation, 79 were old enough to have been in at least one earlier casebook. 
Of the 79, 62 or 78% had already appeared in one of the five earlier 
casebooks, and 57 or 72% had been in either Corbin or Williston. 
Forty-nine of the cases had been in Corbin, 32 in Williston, 28 in 
Keener, 15 in Langdel/, and 7 in Huffcut & Woodruff. Fuller had only 
108 cases on these topics, but 85 were old enough to have been in-
cluded in an earlier casebook. Of these, 63 or 74% had appeared; 60 
cases or 70% had been in either Corbin or Williston, 51 in Corbin, 33 
in Williston, 26 in Keener, 16 in Langdel/, and 10 in Huffcut & Wood-
193. See Oliphant, supra note 121, at 645, noting that the "most striking feature" of Corbin's 
casebook, one "being talked about," was that over 40% of the cases were decided since 1900. See 
also Book Review, supra note 121, at 316, noting that over half of Corbin's cases were decided 
since 1900. 
194. The 1941 edition was dedicated to Corbin. 
195. Langdell's most lasting contribution in terms of cases, however, was probably the series 
on the development of constructive conditions of exchange, including Pordage v. Cole (1669), 
Kingston v. Preston (1773), Morton v. Lamb (1797), and Boone v. Eyre (1777). 
196. The considerable influence of Langdell on Keener is suggested by the fact that of 112 
cases in Keener on mutual assent and consideration that were old enough to have been in Lang-
dell's second edition, 76 or 68% of these had appeared in Langdell. Huffcut and Woodruff's 
influence on Keener was far less. Of 69 American cases in Keener on these topics that were old 
enough to have been in Huffeut & Woodruff, only 16 or 23% had appeared in their anthology. 
Both Williston and Corbin owed a considerable debt to their predecessors Langdell, Keener, 
and Huffcut and Woodruff. Of Williston's 103 cases on mutual assent and consideration that 
were old enough to have been in one of those earlier anthologies, 68 or 66% had already ap-
peared in one of them. Of 122 such cases in Corbin, 76 or 62% had already been used. 
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ruff. Kessler and Sharp had only 66 cases on mutual assent and con-
sideration. Only 36 were old enough, and of these only 23 or 64% had 
already appeared, with only 19 or 53% having been in either Corbin or 
Williston. Nineteen were in Corbin, 9 were in Williston, a surprising 
12 were in Keener, 7 were in Langdell, and 3 were in Hujfcut & Wood-
ruff. As for the influence of the early anthologists, the enormous im-
pact of the combined works of Corbin and Williston is evident. It is 
somewhat surprising that Corbin's influence on the selection of cases 
so exceeded Williston's, even taldng into consideration the far greater 
number of cases in Corbin's anthology. This must have been due in 
part to the circumstance that Williston's 1922 anthology was to a 
great extent a revised version of his 1903 edition, while Corbin's 1921 
anthology was a fresh new product. The considerable influence of 
Keener, when compared with Langdell and with Huffcut and Wood-
ruff is also of interest. As for the extent to which the modem 
casebooks were influenced, it comes as no surprise that Patterson and 
Goble were the most influenced by their predecessors and Kessler and 
Sharp the least influenced.197 
Many of the cases that were reused in the early contracts 
casebooks are still well known today. Who first used those cases? 
Langdell is responsible for many of the English cases, including 
Adams v. Lindsell, Kingston v. Preston, 198 Pillans v. Van Mierop, 
Thomas v. Thomas, Dickinson v. Dodds, and Raffles v. Wichelhaus. 199 
But he omitted Hadley v. Baxendale, Hochster v. de la Tour, and Tay-
lor v. Caldwell because he did not deal with their subject matter. 
Hochster was added by Williston in 1894, Taylor fu;st appeared in 
Keener in 1898, but Hadley, though included in Keener's 1891 bor-
rowing from Finch and a staple in casebooks on damages, did not re-
appear in contracts casebooks until it was used by Grismore in 1931. 
Keener also added Foakes v. Beer and Carlill v. Carbolic Smoke Ball 
Co. 
Langdell's responsibility for leading American cases is, of course, 
more limited, but he did include Mills v. Wyman and Gray v. Gardner. 
Huffcut and Woodruff added many still-familiar nineteenth-century 
American cases in 1894. These included Aller v. Aller, Hamer v. Sid-
way, Hobbs v. Massasoit Whip Co., Lingenfelder v. Wainwright Brew-
ing Co., Moulton v. Kershaw, Schnell v. Nell, Sherwood v. Walker, and 
197. Fuller seems not to have been greatly influenced by Patterson and Goble. Of his 107 
cases on these topics that were early enough to have been included in Patterson & Goble, only 37 
or 35% were. Nor were Kessler and Sharp much more influenced by either Patterson and Goble 
or by Fuller. Of their 56 cases on these topics that were early enough to have been in Patterson & 
Goble, only 22 or 39% were. Of 61 cases early enough to have been in Fuller, 23 or 38% were. 
198. Kingston v. Preston was presented as part of the opinion in Jones v. Barkley and not a 
principal case. 
199. Dickinson and Raffles did not appear until his second edition, belatedly in the case of 
Raffles, which had been decided in 1864. 
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Wood v. Boynton. Along with Williston's volume of the same year, 
they were also responsible for Anderson v. May, Clark v. Marsiglia, 
Devocmon v. Shaw, Dingley v. Oler, Lawrence v. Fox, Nolan v. 
Whitney, Norrington v. Wright, and White v. Corlies & Tift. Williston 
in 1894 also added Buttelfield v. Byron and Stees v. Leonard and in 
1903 Ayer v. Western Union Telegraph Co. and Kirksey v. Kirksey. 
Keener's American contributions were more modest but included 
Bishop v. Eaton, Day v. Caton, and Strong v. Sheffield. 
By the time that Corbin and Costigan published their casebooks in 
1921, nineteenth-century American cases had been thoroughly picked 
over by their predecessors, but Corbin introduced Gill v. Johnstown 
Lumber and Costigan introduced Fairmount Glass Works v. Grunden 
Martin Wooden ware and Ricketts v. Scothorn. 200 Other significant ad-
ditions of early cases were largely the result of the inclusion of new 
topics such as restitution in the contracts course. Thus Patterson in 
1935 was the first to use Britton v. Turner, and Gardner in 1938 added 
Chase v. Corcoran. 
It is tempting to surmise that the early emphasis on English cases 
had a lasting effect on American law,201 but it is not easy to document 
this. It is difficult to point to a single American case of note that, 
having been excluded by the early anthologists, was not found and 
used by a later anthologist. A possible candidate is Brayton v. 
Chase, 202 a Wisconsin case decided in 1854, the same year as Hadley v. 
Baxendale, and cited by Friedman as anticipating the rule of that cele-
brated English case. 203 Keener, however, featured the English case 
and ignored the Wisconsin one. 204 
Are we to suppose that, but for the anglophilia of the early 
anthologists, generations of American lawyers would have spoken rev-
erently of the "rule in Brayton v. Chase" rather than the "rule in Had-
ley v. Baxendale"? It seems unlikely. The opinion of the Wisconsin 
court is far less interesting than that of the English bench. The case 
grew out of an action by a farmer who had contracted to buy a reaper 
and who, when the reaper was not delivered in time, lost "large crops 
200. Havighurst, who had included Ricketts in 1934, noted that the case had appeared in 
Costigan "before it had achieved respectability by action of the American Law Institute." Havig-
hurst, Book Review, 21 IOWA L. REV. 661, 662 (1936). 
201. Gilmore suggests this by explaining that Langdell thought that the legal scholar's func-
tion was "to winnow out from the chaff those very few cases which have ever been correctly 
decided and which, if we follow them, will lead us to the truth." G. GILMORE, supra note 23, at 
47. 
202. 3 Wis. 456 (1854). 
203. See L. FRIEDMAN, supra note 68, at 536; L. FRIEDMAN, CONTRACT LAW IN AMERICA: 
A SOCIAL AND EcONOMIC CASE STUDY 125-26 (1965) [hereinafter L. FRIEDMAN, CONTRACT 
LAW IN AMERICA]. 
204. Langdell, to be sure, used neither case. See text accompanying notes 139-40 supra. 
Hadley v. Baxendale was also used, for example; in J. BEALE, A COLLECTION OF CASES ON THE 
MEASURE OF DAMAGES (1895), a collection that was distinctly less anglophilic than Langdell's. 
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of winter and spring grain."205 The court quoted Greenleaf on Evi-
dence for the proposition that " 'the damage to be recovered must al-
ways be the natural and proximate consequence of the act complained 
of.' "206 After the quotation, the court added only that the damages 
sought "were too remote" and resulted from the plaintiff's "peculiar 
situation" - a conclusion that Friedman faults as looking only to "the 
deal itself, as an abstract mathematical occurrence, ... not its conse-
quences.''207 Huffcut and Woodruff did not include Brayton v. Chase 
in their all-American anthology, Corbin's monumental treatises did 
not cite it, and Williston's gave it only passing mention.208 It seems 
unlikely that more broad-minded anthologists would have used the 
Wisconsin case instead of the English one, or that had they done so 
the Wisconsin case would have achieved comparable celebrity. 
D. On Doctrine 
To what extent did the early anthologists use their anthologies to 
influence the development of doctrine? The authorial presence is un-
disguised by today's interventionist casebook editors. They take it as 
given that it is proper overtly to question and to criticize the cases that 
they have included and sometimes to present the subject so as to re-
flect their own theories and idiosyncracies. 209 
The editors of the early casebooks, however, would have had none 
of this. Although legend has it that students were not spared professo-
rial theories and idiosyncracies in the classroom, the anthologies them-
selves were barren of these. With the exception of Keener's short-
lived borrowing from Leake, they included only cases, usually re-
printed in full, and with any omissions carefully noted.210 Langdell, 
Keener, and Huffcut and Woodward contributed virtually nothing be-
yond the headings for chapters and sections. Although the "index" 
that accompanied Langdell's first edition gave capsule holdings for 
many of his cases and the Summary that was published with his sec-
ond edition contained dogmatic explanations of which of the cases 
were "right" and which were "wrong,"211 the pristine casebooks 
205. 3 Wis. at 456. 
206. 3 Wis. at 460 (quoting 2 s. GREENLEAF, A TREATISE ON THE LAW OF EVIDENCE 
§ 256 (Philadelphia & London 1846)). 
207. L. FRIEDMAN, CONTRACT LAW IN AMERICA, supra note 203, at 126. 
208. It is in a string citation in 3 S. WILLISTON, supra note 107, § 1355 n.75. 
209. See Klare, supra note 132, at 885 (observing that "cases are organized under broader 
moral, social and political [rather than doctrinal] themes"); F. KESSLER, G. GILMORE & A. 
KRONMAN, CONTRACTS: CASES AND MATERIALS 12 (3d ed. 1986) ("A profitable approach to 
the Jaw of contract •.• is to view legal doctrine, rules, principles, and standards as reflecting the 
value system of the culture in which the legal system is embedded."). 
210. See text accompanying note 56 supra. 
211. See G. GILMORE, supra note 4, at 13. Williston, in the preface to his 1903 edition, took 
ajab at his predecessor's index by expressing the hope that the index to the 1903 edition would 
"make the contents of the book reasonably accessible without being open to the objection of 
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themselves had no notes, no questions, no problems - nothing to 
break the student's concentration on the cases. The title page of Lang-
dell's casebook bore these words of Lord Coke: "The advised and or-
derly reading of the books at large, I absolutely determine to be the 
right way to enduring and perfect knowledge. "212 
Even the chapter and section headings were restrained, for, as Wil-
liston noted in the preface to his 1903 edition, they "may easily be 
made a key to the results of the cases, and it is desirable for the student 
to work out this result for himself with the aid only of such suggestion 
as proves necessary in the classroom."213 Corbin, however, departed 
from this tradition by using a much more detailed organization with 
more enlightening section captions, sometimes amplified by suggestive 
parentheses, for example, "Mutual Promises as Consideration for 
Each Other (Conditional and Illusory Promises - Mutuality of Legal 
Duty or Obligation)."214 
Williston instituted the practice of adding footnotes to many cases 
citing other cases on the same point. Thus, for example, in his second 
edition in 1922, Kirksey v. Kirksey had appended to it a long footnote 
quoting one case and citing seven others.215 Corbin followed Willis-
ton's practice of adding footnotes and went beyond it by inserting sev-
eral bits of introductory text of his own and by offering occasional 
opinions in his footnotes. Thus his chapter on consideration began 
with a page of text including quotations of several definitions of "con-
sideration," and his cases on conditions were preceded by over two 
and a half pages of text on conditions and the dependency of promises 
- the former quoting from his then-recent article on consideration 
without indicating his authorship and the latter omitting to cite his 
then-recent article on conditions.216 
Even this restrained authorial presence evoked criticism from one 
reviewer, Clarke Butler Whittier of Stanford, who faulted Corbin for 
occasionally using his footnotes "to present the author's views or rea-
soning rather than as mirrors of the authorities. . . . This is leading the 
student and sometimes it will happen that he is led in a direction 
which the instructor will think erroneous."217 Whittier's views were, 
giving the student the answer before he has done the problem." 1 S. WILLISTON, supra note 55, 
at iii. 
212. c. LANGDELL, CASES, supra note 15, at i. 
213. 1 S. WILLISTON, supra note 55, at iii. 
214. A. CORBIN, supra note 113, at 292; see also text at note 280 infra. 
215. One "in accord" and six "but see." 
216. Corbin, Does a Pre-Existing Duty Defeat Consideration? - Recent Noteworthy Deci-
sions, 27 YALE L.J. 362, 376 (1918) [hereinafter Corbin, Pre-existing Duty]; Corbin, Conditions in 
the Law of Contracts, 28 YALE L.J. 379 (1919). 
217. Whittier, supra note 164, at 222. Whittier gave five examples. In a footnote on page 72, 
Corbin, addressing the power of offeror and offeree to renege when an offer seeks an act as 
acceptance, proposed a rule that "appears reasonable and just, although not supported as to the 
second part by any judicial decisions." A. CORBIN, supra note 113, at 72 n.45. In a footnote that 
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however, not shared by others who favored a more active role for the 
casebook editor. Thus Henry Ballantine of Minnesota, reviewing 
Corbin, wrote that it would be "helpful if more complete references 
were given to leading legal articles" and if "more problem material 
[were] included in our casebooks."218 And Costigan's audacious use 
of footnotes that not only posed questions for the student but cited and 
even quoted secondary authorities prompted Oliphant to write that 
the book's "most striking feature" was its "abundance of references to 
the academic opinion to be found in law journals and text-books."219 
It fell to Patterson in 1935 and to Goble in 1937 to elevate the note 
material so that it was "not printed in forbidding fine print at the bot-
tom of the page" but "after the cases . . . in only slightly smaller 
type."220 Patterson, the only legal realist to produce a contracts 
casebook, 221 favored the use of questions and problems so that discus-
sion might be "less an impromptu dialectic between student and 
teacher, in which the latter triumphantly pulls the rabbit from the hat, 
and more a sustained exploration of implications which are fully 
sensed in advance."222 He was the first to use the caption "cases and 
materials" on contracts - the "materials" consisting largely of di-
gested cases and his notes containing questions and problems.223 It 
took up most of page 76, Corbin noted that there are "many apparently conflicting cases as to 
whether a guarantor is bound in the absence of any notice by the creditor" and summarized the 
holding of these cases. Id. at 76 n.47. On page 85, a footnote asked the student to observe that in 
the four preceding cases the contract was "unilateral, the only legal duty created being on the 
olferee, with the correlative right in the olferor. Such transactions are often described, somewhat 
inaccurately, as an offer of an act for a promise." Id. at 85 n.52. A footnote on page 235 opined 
that if "a promise is made subject to an express condition, the fulfillment of which requires action 
or forbearance by the promisee, the fulfillment of the condition will usually be held to be suffi-
cient consideration." Id. at 235 n.22. And a footnote on page 267 noted that in "some cases it 
has been held that mere forbearance cannot be a consideration and that there must be a promise 
to forebear, wholly overlooking the possibility of a unilateral contract." Id. at 267 n.40. 
Whittier, who had presumably studied under Williston before his graduation from Harvard 
Law School in 1896, crossed swords with Corbin again in 1923. In an article on contract benefi-
ciaries after citing Corbin's and Williston's articles along with others on that subject, Whittier 
noted, "Professor Williston's discussion is both the most detailed and the most enlightening." 
Whittier, Contract Beneficiaries, 32 YALE L.J. 790, 790 n.l (1923). For a later exchange with 
Corbin, see note 118 supra. Both Fuller and Shepherd were students of Whittier at Stanford. 
218. Ballantine, Book Review, 7 MINN. L. REv. 77, 78 (1922). 
219. Oliphant, supra note 121, at 646. For the same reason, Goble called Costigan's second 
edition "the best case book ever published on the subject of contracts." Goble, supra note 124, at 
592. A few of Costigan's chapters actually began with excerpts from secondary sources. 
220. Woodbridge, Book Review, 24 VA. L. REv. 824, 825 (1938). 
221. At least he is the only one on Llewellyn's famous "sample" of twenty legal realists, 
except for Corbin, whose inclusion would be questioned by many and who, in any case, was not a 
legal realist when he produced his casebook in 1921. See W. TwINING, supra note 90, at 76; see 
also Llewellyn, On the Problem of Teaching ''Private" Law, 54 HARV. L. REv. 775, 775 (1941) 
("The modern editor ... has .. in his annotations and his passages of text, provided material you 
had not previously seen at all."). 
222. 1 E. PATIERSON, supra note 128, at vi. Curiously, as one reviewer lamented, Patterson 
& Goble did not use the term "contract of adhesion," though it had been Patterson who had 
introduced it into the United States. Levin, supra note 130, at 741. 
223. Page, whose casebook also appeared in 1935, used the title "cases and readings," but the 
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was Fuller in 1947 who broke from tradition by weaving among the 
principal cases his own text, excerpts from secondary sources, and di-
gests of cases - all in the same type as the principal cases themselves. 
As the Age of the Anthology came to an end, cases were no longer 
presented as a mere gathering of flowers, juxtaposed against each 
other, but rather set against a background of scholarly writing that 
more often than not accorded with the editor's own conceptions. 
But were even the early anthologists as reluctant to insinuate their 
opinions as the pristine character of their anthologies suggests? Not 
according to Friedman, who argues that "these bare, spare books car-
ried to its extreme a most striking characteristic of the style of teach-
ing they reflected. This was the Socratic masquerade: the art of 
saying everything while appearing to say nothing at all."224 How 
much did the early anthologists insinuate their opinions, whether by 
design or not, simply by the inclusion, the omission, and the juxtaposi-
tion of cases? 
Concessions were, of course, made to the level of the beginning law 
student. Thus Langdell's omission of Slade's Case has been explained 
on the ground that he concluded that "the entire early history of con-
sideration as it developed over the century subsequent to Slade's Case 
around the action of assumpsit was far too chaotic and obscure for 
student consumption."225 Some of Langdell's contemporaries, how-
ever, felt that he included too much. Thus Holmes thought that the 
cases on forbearance as consideration were 
collected with an over-scrupulous minuteness ... as if the desire to give 
the whole history of the doctrine had led to putting in some contradic-
tory and unreasoned determinations which could have been spared. In-
deed, one surmises that a skeptical vein in the editor is sometimes 
answerable for the prominence given to the other side of what is now 
settled. 226 
The early anthologists were not, however, subject to the con-
book contained virtually no readings. Patterson's use of digests came just a few years after Liew· 
ellyn's extensive use of digests in his sales casebook in 1930. Ashley had used digests in his 
contracts casebook of 1891. 
224. L. FRIEDMAN, supra note 68, at 632. 
225. Barnes, Introduction to c. LANGDELL, A SELECTION OF CASES ON THE LAW OF CON· 
TRACI'S at 16 (Legal Classics Library ed. 1983). Barnes singles out this omission of "a point of 
departure" in the law of contract as Langdell's "most apparent" and "most egregious" omission, 
but notes that he dealt with Slade's Case in the Summary. Id. at 15-16. 
226. Holmes, Book Notice, 5 AM. L. REV. 539, 540 (1871), reprinted in JUSTICE OLIVER 
WENDELL HOLMES: HIS BOOK NOTICES AND UNCOLLECTED LETTERS AND PAPERS, at 89-91 
(H. Shriver ed. 1936); see also Book Review, 5 S. L. REv. 872, 872 (1880) ("he seems to have 
thought that if a few overruled cases could be thrown in, it would be in some way an advan· 
tage"). (Two reviews by Holmes ofLangdell's casebooks are reprinted in JUSTICE OLIVER WEN· 
DELL HOLMES: His BOOK NOTICES AND UNCOLLECTED LETTERS AND PAPERS, supra, at 89· 
94.) By 1881, however, Holmes seems to have had an even more critical view, for he wrote to 
Pollock of the Summary that "to my mind [Langdell] represents the powers of darkness" and 
that "his explanations and reconciliations of the cases [in the Summary] would have astonished 
the judges who decided them." HOLMES-POLLOCK LETTERS 17 (M. Howe ed. 1941). 
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straints of space that inhibit contemporary casebook editors. While 
representative modem casebooks give comprehensive coverage with a 
mere 150 to 250 principal cases, Langdell had the luxury of using 
nearly 340 cases to present a fragment of the subject; Williston used 
over 400 and Corbin nearly 600 to present the subject with such im-
portant exclusions as remedies. There can be no doubt that Langdell 
and the other early anthologists took advantage of this luxury to ad-
vance their pet ideas. It is easy, for example, to discern Langdell's 
interest in including his one French case, for it contained nearly six 
pages of argument by Merlin against the mailbox rule, an argument in 
which Langdell himself joined, though without notable 
consequences. 227 
In part III of this article I examine in more depth the extent to 
which the anthologies reflected the positions of the anthologists. I fo-
cus on two controversies that were prominent during the period in 
question, in which the anthologists themselves played a major role and 
which retain their interest today. These controversies involved reli-
ance on a unilateral offer and reliance on a gratuitous promise. 
III. EXAMPLES OF INTERVENTIONISM AMONG ANTHOLOGISTS 
A. Reliance on a Unilateral Offer 
Can an offeror who has sought a return performance revoke the 
offer once the offeror has relied by rendering part of the performance? 
The singularly impractical nature of the question is suggested by two 
classic hypotheticals. One involves the offeror who promises $25 in 
return for the offeree's moving a heavy safe to an office in another 
building and who revokes when the offeree has carried the safe to the 
door of that building. 228 The other involves the offeror who promises 
$100 in return for the offeree's walking across the Brooklyn Bridge 
and who revokes when the offeree has gotten half way across. 229 Is the 
revocation effective? 
Langdell harbored no doubts concerning the answer. Since "the 
promise is made in legal intendment at the moment when the perform-
ance of the consideration is completed," it follows that the offer may 
be revoked up to that moment: 
As this may cause great hardship and practical injustice, ingenious at-
227. See S. v. F. in C. LANGDELL, CASES, supra note 15, at 155. In § 14 of the Summary 
Langdell wrote, "The case of S. v. F. contains a powerful argument ... in support of the view 
adopted by McCulloch v. The Eagle Ins. Co., but the point was not decided." C. LANGDELL, 
SUMMARY, supra note 19, § 14 (italics deleted). The case was used by Keener in 1898 and an 
excerpt appeared in Patterson & Goble in 1941. 
228. See Ashley, Offers Calling for a Consideration Other than a Counter Promise, 23 HARV. 
L. REV. 159, 160-61 (1910). Ashley's article was substantially reproduced in his text. C. 
AsHLEY, supra note 71, § 30. 
229. See Wormser, The True Conception of Unilateral Contracts, 26 YALE L.J. 136, 136-37 
(1916). 
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tempts have been made to show that the offer becomes irrevocable as 
soon as performance of the consideration begins; but such a view seems 
to have no principle to rest upon .... The true protection for both parties 
is to have a binding contract made before performance begins ... and if 
they neglect this precaution, any hardship that they may suffer should be 
laid at their own doors.230 
Langdell's view did not go unnoticed, but less than sixty years later, 
following an extensive debate in the law reviews, the American Law 
Institute endorsed a contrary rule. Under Restatement section 45, 
once the offeree has rendered part of the performance, the offeror is 
bound by an option contract and is not free to revoke the offer. To 
what extent did the anthologies take sides in this controversy? 
The only selection in Langdell's anthology that bears on the revo-
cability of a unilateral offer is Offord v. Davies, 231 an English case de-
cided by the Court of Common Pleas in 1862. The actual dispute 
involved a different question, the revocability of an offer looking to a 
series of unilateral contracts. But in the course of the argument, re-
produced in Langdell's casebook, Williams, J., asked, "Suppose I 
guarantee the price of a carriage to be built by a third party who, 
before the carriage is finished and consequently before I am bound to 
pay for it, becomes insolvent, may I recall my guaranty?" As to this, 
Erle, C.J., remarked, "Before it ripens into a contract either party may 
withdraw and so put an end to the matter. But the moment the coach-
builder has prepared the materials he would probably be found by the 
jury to have contracted." In his Summary, Langdell cited Offord v. 
Davies in support of his view, evidently referring to the first sentence 
of this remark. He also cited it as an illustration of the unprincipled 
but "ingenious attempts" to justify a view contrary to his, apparently 
alluding to the argument of counsel and the second sentence of the 
response. 232 
It is hard to fault Langdell for his choice of Offord v. Davies as a 
springboard for the discussion of the question. Subsequent scholars 
have not unearthed a suitable American case of that time that better 
calls Langdell's own view into question.233 Offord v. Davies was used 
as a principal case by Keener, Williston, and Corbin and figured prom-
inently in scholarly debate over the question.234 It is at least plausible 
230. c. LANGDELL, SUMMARY, supra note 19, § 4, at 3-4. 
231. 12 C.B. (N.S.) 748, 142 Eng. Rep. 1336 (C.P. 1862). 
232. c. LANGDELL, SUMMARY, supra note 19, § 4. 
233. McGovney relied for support on the dissent of Justice Preston of the Supreme Court of 
Louisiana in Cornelson v. Sun Mut. Ins. Co., 7 La. Ann. 345, 347 (1852). McGovney, Irrevoca-
ble Offers, 27 HARV. L. REv. 644, 655-56 (1914). Langdell's Summary noted that Bradbury v. 
Morgan, 1 H. & C. 249, 158 Eng. Rep. 877 (1862), cited during argument in Offord v. Davies, "is 
contra, but it must be deemed erroneous." C. LANGDELL, SUMMARY supra note 19, § 4, at 3 n.3. 
234. Offord v. Davies is used to support Langdell's view in Wormser, supra note 229, at 140-
41, the second sentence of the response of Earle, C.J., being put down as a surmise that "if the 
oral remarks were passed upon by a jury," the jury might find "in the usual loose fashion of 
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to conclude that its popularity as a vehicle in the classroom contrib-
uted in an important way to the attention paid to it in the literature of 
the time. 235 
In his two-volume edition of 1903, Williston included a second 
case that bore on the issue of reliance on a unilateral offer. In Biggers 
v. Owen, 236 an 1887 Georgia case, the court held that an offer of a 
reward for delivery of a murderer with evidence to convict had been 
withdrawn. "An offer of reward is nothing more than a proposition 
... and until some one complies with the terms or conditions of that 
offer, it may be withdrawn."237 The inference that there is no accept-
ance of an offer until completion of the requested performance sup-
ported Langdell's view - which was presumably shared by Williston. 
Williston made no use, however, of two other cases, both of which 
cast doubt on Langdell's view. Plumb v. Campbel/ 238 was an 1888 
Illinois case holding that the statute of limitations for written rather 
than oral contracts applied where, though the writing contained no 
promise by the plaintiff, the plaintiff alleged full performance. In the 
course of its opinion, the court seemed to say by way of dictum that an 
offer of a unilateral contract could be accepted not only by rendering 
the requested performance, but also by "engaging, within a reasonable 
time, to perform the contract" or "by beginning such performance in a 
way which would bind him to complete it."239 Los Angeles Traction 
Co. v. Wilshire 240 was a 1902 California case holding that though an 
offer to pay $2000 on the offeree's completion of its street railway was 
at its inception "unilateral," once the "promised [sic] consideration 
had ... been partly performed, ... the contract had taken on a bilat-
eral character," and the offeror could no longer revoke the offer, since 
to do so "would be manifestly unjust."241 Williston cited both cases in 
his 1906 edition of Wald's Pollock, observing, "The difficulty with 
juries" a bilateral contract. It is used to support the opposing view in McGovney, supra note 
233, at 658. 
235. The case appeared in Langdell, Keener, and Williston before it was used in the articles 
cited in the preceding footnote. Wormser noted in a footnote to his article that it appeared in the 
edition of Keener that he edited. Wormser, supra note 229, at 140 n.4. 
236. 79 Ga. 658, 5 S.E. 193 (1887). 
237. 79 Ga. at 659-60, 5 S.E. at 193. 
238. 129 Ill. 101, 18 N.E. 790 (1888). 
239. 129 Ill. at 107, 18 N.E. at 792. Although the notion that an offer of a unilateral contract 
could be accepted by a mere engagement of any sort would have been an anathema to Langdell, 
the court found support in Langdell's own teacher, Parsons. For Parsons had attempted to re-
fute the contention that unilateral contracts lacked mutuality of obligation by arguing that the 
"party making the promise is bound to nothing until the promisee ... engages to do, or else does 
or begins to do, the thing which is the condition of the first promise." 129 Ill. at 106, 18 N.E. at 
791 (quoting T. PARSONS, supra note 11, at 375). 
240. 135 Cal. 654, 67 P. 1086 (1902). For an earlier case reaching a contrary result on 
similar facts, see Gray v. Hinton, 7 F. 81 (C.C.D. Neb. 1881), first used as a digested case by 
Fuller in 1947. 
241. 135 Cal. at 658, 67 P. at 1088. 
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these solutions of the problem is that they fail to take into account the 
offerer's right to impose such conditions as he chooses in his offer."242 
Just prior to American entry into World War I, the merits of 
Langdell's view were hotly debated in the law reviews. This was the 
first great debate on contract law to be conducted in this relatively new 
forum; it took place as the lean years were drawing to a close, with 
four articles appearing between 1910 and 1917. The first was by 
Ashley. He mentioned Biggers v. Owen, discussed the "singular" case 
of Los Angeles Traction Co. v. Wilshire and its "confusion of thought," 
and speculated that the quotation from Parsons in Plumb v. Campbell 
was intended to refer to bilateral contracts. Concluding that the 
"harsh results which are possible in this class of cases are revolting to 
a natural sense of justice," he suggested that the offeree's reliance 
might give rise to a "possible estoppel."243 Dudley Odell McGovney, 
of Tulane and later Missouri, Iowa, and Berkeley, followed with a 
1914 article in which he cited the exchange during the argument of 
Offord v. Davies to show that "[i]n case of doubt the courts interpret 
an offer as contemplating a bilateral contract," but argued that this 
was not necessary to protect the offeree. Even if the offer were re-
ported as one for a unilateral contract, the offeror should be regarded 
as making two offers, one "the principal offer" and "another, or collat-
eral, offer to keep the principal offer open for a reasonable time if the 
offeree begins work at once." He thus went beyond Ashley's "tenta-
tive suggestion that an equitable estoppel might sometimes be invoked 
as a solution of the difficulty"244 and proposed a mechanism to reach 
the desired result. 
Wormser defended Langdell's view in a 1916 article, condemning 
Plumb v. Campbell and Los Angeles Traction Co. v. Wilshire as 
"marked by [a] lack of clear thinking," applauding the recognition of 
"the conception of unilateral contracts" by Erle, C.J., in Offord v. Da-
vies, and maintaining, like Langdell, that he could "see no injustice 
whatever in the operation of the doctrine of unilateral contract."245 
Corbin in a 1917 article summarized his view of the debate in this way: 
Where an offer has been made so that it can be accepted only by per-
242. F. POLLOCK, PRINCIPLES OF CONTRACT 34 n.39 (S. Williston & G. Wald 3d ed. 1906). 
These two cases differed from cases like Martin v. Meles, 179 Mass. 114, 60 N.E. 397 (1901), a 
favorite of anthologists added by Williston in 1903, in which Holmes had used traditional analy-
sis to conclude that an offer to contribute to the defense of a lawsuit by a committee sought a 
promise by the committee and that the committee had impliedly given its promise. See text at 
note 276 infra. 
243. Ashley, supra note 228, at 163-67. Pollock, however, took a position similar to that of 
Parsons, saying that "surely the acceptance is complete" on an "unequivocal beginning of the 
performance requested,'' and dismissed Ashley's argument as "a very ingenious exercise in legal 
sophistry." F. POLLOCK, PRINCIPLES OF CONTRACT 26 & n.(c) (8th ed. 1911). McGovney, in 
turn, wrote that Pollock "has taken the problem too lightly." McGovney, supra note 233, at 657. 
244. McGovney, supra note 233, at 657-59. 
245. Wormser, supra note 229, at 136, 140-41, 142. 
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forming a series of acts requiring an appreciable length of time and effort 
or expense, such offer shall be irrevocable after the offeree has begun the 
performance of the requested acts, unless the offeror expressly reserved 
the power of revocation. 246 
Corbin's 1921 anthology included three cases on the question of 
reliance on a unilateral offer: Offord v. Davies, Los Angeles Traction 
Co. v. Wilshire, and Brackenbury v. Hodgkin. 247 The last had been 
decided by the Supreme Court of Maine in 1917, too recently to have 
figured in the law review debate. It held that a mother's promise to 
her daughter and son-in-law to leave them her farm if they would 
move from Missouri and care for her for her life was accepted by mov-
ing from Missouri and beginning performance. In a long footnote to 
Los Angeles Traction, Corbin cited cases, referred to the articles by 
McGovney and himself, and quoted Pollack's criticism of Ashley.248 
While the existence of a controversy was clear, it nevertheless might 
not have been apparent to a student which side of the controversy 
Corbin was on. To a practiced eye, however, the prominence given to 
the question by the use of both Los Angeles Traction and Brackenbury, 
coupled with the extensive treatment in the footnote, leaves no doubts 
as to Corbin's sympathies. 
Williston's second edition in 1922 also added Brackenbury, accom-
panied by a footnote on civil law rules as to revocability of offers and a 
citation to Ihering's work on culpa in contrahendo. 249 Still no mention 
was made of Los Angeles Traction and nothing was added about the 
debate in the law reviews. Williston was not to warm to the offeree's 
position until several years later when, in 1925, he took McGovney's 
proposal as redrafted by Corbin and made it his own in Restatement 
section 45.250 In arguing for that rule, Williston admitted that it 
"seems difficult on theory successfully to question the power" to re-
voke, "but great injustice may arise" if the power continues.251 (He 
had written five years earlier in his treatise that it "seems impossible on 
theory successfully to question the power ... though obvious injustice 
may arise."252) "The difficulty," he went on, "may best be met and the 
246. Corbin, Offer and Acceptance, and Some of the Resulting Legal Relations, 26 YALE L.J. 
169, 195 (1917). Corbin not only foreshadowed Restatement§ 45 but also addressed the question 
of mitigation, which § 45 does not. Id. at 196. Yet another short article appeared a few years 
later. Ballantine, Acceptance of Offers for Unilateral Contracts by Partial Performance of Service 
Requested, 5 MINN. L. REv. 94 (1921). 
247. 116 Me. 399, 102 A. 106 (1917). 
248. A. CORBIN, supra note 113, at 190 n.2. 
249. s. WILLISTON, A SELECTION OF CASES ON THE LAW OF CONTRACTS 65 n.l (2d ed. 
1922). 
250. Unaccountably, Williston failed to make use of Corbin's qualification based on the no-
tion of mitigation. See note 246 supra. 
251. AM. LAW INST., CONTRACTS TREATISE No. 1 (A) SUPPORTING RESTATEMENT No. 1 
§ 68, at 132 (1925) (S. Williston, Reporter). 
252. 1 S. WILLISTON, supra note 107, § 60, at 100 (emphasis added). 
1454 Michigan Law Review [Vol. 85:1406 
hardship avoided" by implication of a "subordinate offer to keep the 
main offer open," an analysis that "finds some support" in English 
cases inferring a collateral contract from attendance at an auction.253 
(He had described this analysis in his treatise as a "suggestion," which 
he rejected partly because it was "open to the criticism made of [the 
English auction] cases; namely, that the necessary assumptions of fact 
are artificial."254) Williston had finally given in and abandoned Lang-
dell's position for that of the opposition represented by Ashley, 
McGovney, and Corbin. 
Though the anthologies of Corbin and Williston reflected views on 
the controversy, they seem to have had little impact on its resolution. 
That battle was won in the pages of the law reviews and not in those of 
the anthologies. Indeed, McGovney was not an anthologist at all and 
Ashley was not notable as one. Were anthologies a more potent force 
when it came to the effect of reliance on a gratuitous promise? 
B. Reliance on a Gratuitous Promise 
Can a promisor who has made a gratuitous promise retract it once 
the promisee has relied on it? A hoary example is Kirksey v. Kirk-
sey, 255 handed down by the Supreme Court of Alabama in 1845. As 
Williston told it in his 1906 edition of Pollock: 
[T]he defendant wrote to his brother's widow: "If you will come down 
and see me, I will let you have a place to raise your family, and I have 
more open land than I can tend; and on the account of your situation 
and that of your family, I feel like I want you and the children to do 
well." The widow came as requested, but it was held that no contract 
was created thereby. 256 
Williston used the case to illustrate a distinction "not brought out by 
the English decisions and not referred to by [Pollock,] . . . that be-
tween consideration and condition."257 But should not the widow's 
reliance have made the promise binding even in the absence of consid-
eration? It would do so under section 90 of the Restatement of Con-
tracts, the influential "promissory estoppel" section. 
This heresy did not occur to the antebellum mind, trained in the 
orthodoxy that a promise needed consideration or a seal to be binding. 
Nor did it occur to Langdell or other contracts scholars of his century. 
For minds that resisted the leap expressed in Restatement section 45, 
the leap expressed in section 90 was inconceivable. Keener's 1898 edi-
tion contained Presbyterian Church of Albany v. Cooper, 258 a 1889 
253. AM. LAW INST., supra note 251, § 68, at 134. 
254. 1 S. WILLISTON, supra note 107, § 60, at 101. 
255. 8 Ala. 131 (1845). 
256. F. POLLOCK, supra note 242, at 215-16 n.24. 
257. Id. at 215 n.24. 
258. 112 N.Y. 517, 20 N.E. 352 (1889). 
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New York case holding a charitable subscription unenforceable for 
lack of consideration, but there was no suggestion that an alternative 
basis for enforceability had been overlooked. 259 
Gratuitous bailments were a notable exception. Langdell included 
four cases, all English, in a section on gratuitous bailment in his con-
sideration chapter. Their message appeared in the index in a summary 
of Wheatley v. Low: "The delivery of 10£ by A to B is a good consid-
eration for a promise by B to pay the same to C without delay, though 
B is to receive no compensation for so doing; the entrusting of the 
money to B being a detriment to A."260 He later explained in the 
Summary that absent evidence that the gratuitous bailee made "the 
delivery of the property to him the consideration for his promise ... , 
there is but one reason for holding the bailment to be a consideration, 
namely, that there is no other way of sustaining the promise."261 The 
characterization of such cases of gratuitous undertakings as contracts 
cases was questioned by Joseph Henry Beale in his 1891 article on 
gratuitous undertakings. After remarking on the accepted inadequacy 
of the "ordinary division of personal actions between torts and con-
tracts," he went on to argue that a person might undertake a duty 
toward another "merely by voluntarily entering into a new relation 
towards" the other.262 The examples he gave of such gratuitous un-
dertakings ranged from cases of rescue to cases of bailment, but as to 
all of them he maintained that liability arose out of the relationship 
itself and not out of either contract or tort.263 The notion of reliance 
was not mentioned in Beale's analysis. 
The law reviews produced no early discussions of the effect of reli-
ance on a gratuitous promise comparable to the articles of Ashley, 
McGovney, Wormser, and Corbin on the effect of reliance on a unilat-
eral offer.264 The preface to Ashley's short text of 1911 contained the 
259. Keener coupled the Presbyterian Church case with Sherwin v. Fletcher, 168 Mass. 413, 
47 N.E. 197 (1897), in which a noncharitable subscription was held to be enforceable because 
supported by consideration, suggesting that absent consideration a promise was unenforceable. 
260. C. LANGDELL, CASES, supra note 15, at 1017. Langdell continued: "Wheatley v. Low, 
407 [Cro. Jae. 668, 79 Eng. Rep. 578 (K.B. 1623)], overruling Riches and Brigges, and Pickas v. 
Guile, 406; and see 407, n.(1)." Wheatley v. Low rejected the defendant's contention that he was 
not liable because the plaintiff did not allege "that he delivered it to the defendant upon his 
request." Id. at 407. The index had a separate entry on the fourth case, Hart v. Miles. 
261. C. LANGDELL, SUMMARY, supra note 19, § 68, at 86. He added that in the four cases in 
his Cases "the question arose upon the declaration, and the declaration stated expressly that the 
promise was made in consideration of the bailment." Id. 
262. Beale, Gratuitous Undertakings, 5 HARV. L. REV. 222, 222 (1891). Parsons had written 
that if a person makes a mere gratuitous promise, and then enters upon the performance of it, he 
is held to a full execution of all he has undertaken. 1 T. PARSONS, supra note 11, at 372. But 
Williston later thought that this went too far. AM. LA w INsr., COMMENT ARIES ON CONTRACTS 
RESTATEMENT No. 2, at 18 (1926) (S. Williston, Reporter). 
263. Beale, supra note 262, at 223. 
264. The earliest article, after Beale's, is Billig, The Problem of Consideration in Charitable 
Subscriptions, 12 CORNELL L. REV. 467 (1927); see also Shattuck, Gratuitous Promises-A New 
Writ?, 35 MICH. L. REV. 908 (1937). 
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remarkable prediction that "[t]echnical requirements, such as the acci-
dental and unnecessary doctrine of consideration, are likely to disap-
pear, bringing the law in accord with the modern sense of justice."26s 
But Ashley never went on to develop this thought. 
It was Williston who first produced a thorough analysis of the ef-
fect of reliance on a promise in his treatise in 1920. In dealing with 
gratuitous undertakings, he cited Beale, his Harvard College class-
mate, for the proposition that "a voluntary undertaking may render 
one liable for the consequences of negligent failure to carry out the 
undertaking," but, unlike Beale, he noted that the gist of the action of 
assumpsit on which recovery was based "consisted in undertaking to 
do something and injuring the plaintiff by inducing him to rely on this 
undertaking." Williston concluded, however, that it would have been 
better if the liability of such persons as gratuitous bailees "had been 
left to the law of torts, unless a real bargain was contemplated."266 
The sense that there was an important difference between liability 
based on a gratuitous undertaking and liability based on a "real bar-
gain" was to figure prominently in Williston's later thinking. 
Williston was more supportive of reliance as a basis of contractual 
liability when he came to charitable subscriptions. As early as 1906, in 
his edition of Pollock, Williston had written that "[t]he most noticea-
ble illustration of the tendency of the courts to treat as consideration a 
detriment which was intended merely as a condition is afforded by 
cases of charitable subscriptions."267 Although his 1920 treatise began 
with the caution that the law had not "generally accepted the principle 
that reliance on a gratuitous promise makes the promise binding," he 
concluded that "the enforcement of charitable subscriptions is only to 
be supported if a promissory estoppel be regarded as a sufficient substi-
tute for consideration." In a remarkable bit oflegal realism, he wrote, 
"In a few decisions the court has frankly admitted that estoppel and 
not consideration was the ground on which recovery was allowed," 
adding that the correctness of these decisions "must depend on the 
general allowance of such a promissory estoppel as an alternative for 
consideration."268 In Williston's thinking, liability based on reliance 
on a gratuitous promise was, like liability based on a gratuitous under-
taking, entirely distinct from liability based on bargain. The impor-
tant question was whether liability based on reliance could be 
extended beyond charitable subscriptions to other gratuitous promises. 
As to this Williston had more to say in his treatise in a section on 
265. C. AsHLEY, supra note 71, at vii. 
266. 1 S. WILLISTON, supra note 107, § 138, at 305. In his commentary in support of section 
88, however, Williston wrote that such liability "can be supported on the ground of tort but not 
always." AM. LAW INST., supra note 262, at 18. 
267. F. POLLOCK, supra note 242, at 216 n.24. 
268. 1 S. WILLISTON, supra note 107, § 116, at 249, 252-53. 
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"Estoppel as a substitute for consideration." While pointing out that 
there are "many ... decisions which hold that a detriment incurred in 
reliance on a promise is not valid consideration unless the detriment 
was requested as consideration," he concluded in a more positive vein. 
If it were thought desirable "to enlarge the boundaries of enforceable 
promises . . . , it may fairly be argued that the fundamental basis of 
simple contracts historically was action in justifiable reliance on a 
promise - rather than the more modern notion of purchase of a 
promise for a price." But though this proposition was "by no means 
without intrinsic merit, ... it is opposed to the great weight of author-
ity. "269 Williston seems never to have returned to the possibility that 
justifiable reliance might replace consideration as the general basis for 
the enforcement of all promises. 
This liberality that Williston expressed in his treatise with respect 
to reliance stands in sharp contrast to the orthodoxy that has some-
times been attributed to him in this regard.270 In his anthology, how-
ever, orthodoxy prevailed - perhaps because Williston favored 
feeding students a diet of what courts had done and not what they 
might do, perhaps because Williston's fascination with the familiar at 
the expense of the new hindered him in adding new cases as his think-
ing developed.271 
Williston's 1903 edition featured four cases, none taken from 
Langdell, that bore on the question of reliance on a gratuitous prom-
ise, in addition to one of Langdell's cases on gratuitous bailees.272 The 
four cases appeared in sequence. In Devecmon v. Shaw & Devries, an 
1888 Maryland case, the court held that a jury might conclude that an 
uncle's promise to his nephew to reimburse his expenses if he took a 
trip to Europe, was supported by consideration, for the nephew might 
have been "induced by this promise to spend [his money] in this way, 
instead of some other mode."273 In Kirksey v. Kirksey, the 1845 Ala-
bama case discussed earlier, the court refused to enforce the brother-
in-law's promise, regarding it as a "mere gratuity," unsupported by 
consideration.274 In Presbyterian Church of Albany, the 1889 case 
used by Keener, the court refused to enforce the subscriber's promise 
to a church since, putting aside an ineffective recital of consideration, 
there was nothing more than "a naked promise of the subscribers."275 
269. Id. § 139, at 307, 308, 313. 
270. The lore according to Gilmore has it that Williston resisted Corbin's attempt to include 
in Restatement § 75 a "broad, vague and, essentially, meaningless" definition of consideration, 
but was unable to resist Corbin's continued arguments based on the "estoppel" cases and finally 
agreed to section 90. G. GILMORE, supra note 4, at 62-64. 
27 l. See text at note 193 supra. 
272. Riches v. Briggs, Yelv. 4, 80 Eng. Rep. 4 (K.B. 1601). 
273. 69 Md. 199, 201, 14 A. 464, 465 (1888). 
274. 8 Ala. 131, 133 (1845). 
275. 112 N.Y. 517, 523, 20 N.E. 352, 354 (1889). 
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And inMartin v. Meles, a 1901 Massachusetts case with an opinion by 
Holmes, the court held that a subscriber's promise to contribute to the 
defense of a lawsuit was supported by consideration. 276 The text of the 
message was clear: If, as in Devecmon and Martin, consideration 
could be found, the promise would be enforced; otherwise, as in Kirk-
sey and Presbyterian Church, it would not be. 277 There was, however, 
a subtext. A footnote quoted an Illinois court that enforced a charita-
ble subscription where the charity had incurred liabilities, saying that 
"the gift will be upheld upon the ground of estoppel, and not by reason 
of any valid consideration in the original undertaking."278 At least as 
to charitable subscriptions the alternative of what Williston had called 
in his treatise "promissory estoppel" was not to be ruled out. 
In his 1922 edition, Williston made no changes in these cases and 
only insignificant changes in footnotes. Even in his 1930 edition, 
which appeared after section 90 had been put before the American 
Law Institute, the only change was to replace Presbyterian Church. In 
its stead he used Cardozo's notable 1927 opinion for the New York 
Court of Appeals in Allegheny College v. National Chautauqua County 
Bank, which held a charitable subscription enforceable because sup-
ported by consideration, reserving judgment on whether in New York 
the general law of consideration had been modified by acceptance of 
what Williston's treatise "styled 'a promissory estoppel,'" but con-
taining powerful dictum "that we have adopted the doctrine of prom-
issory estoppel as the equivalent of consideration in connection with 
our law of charitable subscriptions."279 In Williston's mind, the ques-
tion remained that reflected in Cardozo's opinion: was the doctrine 
styled "promissory estoppel" to be generalized so as to be a substitute 
for consideration in cases of gratuitous promises that were not charita-
ble subscriptions? 
Corbin saw the matter differently. In his 1921 anthology, Corbin 
reproduced nine opinions, as opposed to Williston's four, on the effect 
of reliance. Even taking into consideration the greater total of cases in 
Corbin's anthology, it is apparent that he thought reliance of more 
importance than did Williston. Lest the reader miss the point, his 
cases were prefaced by an extraordinarily suggestive section caption: 
"Reliance on a Promise as Consideration (Must Consideration be the 
276. 179 Mass. 114, 60 N.E. 397 (1901); see note 242 supra. 
277. In Williston's 1906 edition of Pollock, however, he cited Devecmon among decisions 
"where promises were enforced though it seemed pretty clear that the so-called consideration 
was not in fact requested in return for the promise." F. POLLOCK, supra note 242, at 216 n.24. 
This reading of Devecmon was not repeated in Williston's treatise in 1920 but reappeared in his 
commentary in support of section 90. See note 262 supra. 
278. S. WILLISTON, supra note 55, at 195 n.l (quoting Beatty v. Western College, 177 Ill. 
280, 292-93, 52 N.E. 432, 436 (1898)). 
279. 246 N.Y. 369, 374, 159 N.E. 173, 175 (1927). 
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Motive of the Promisor or the Inducing Cause of His Promise?)."280 
To Corbin's mind the question was not whether a new doctrine of 
promissory estoppel should be accepted as an alternative to the doc-
trine of consideration, but rather whether the doctrine of considera-
tion itself should be modified to make at least some gratuitous 
promises enforceable. 
Corbin's first two cases presented the bargain theory of considera-
tion. One was Wisconsin & Michigan Railway v. Powers, which fea-
tured Holmes' notable dictum on reciprocal "conventional 
inducement."281 The third was a case holding a carrier liable in tort 
for negligence under a gratuitous undertaking.282 Then came Kirksey 
and Devecmon. These were followed by two cases in which reliance 
was held to be a basis for enforcement. In one, Underwood Typewriter 
Co. v. Century Realty Co., 283 Corbin made sure the student did not 
miss his point by appending a footnote with the lower court's explana-
tion that if a promisee acts "relying upon the faith of the promise, the 
element of consideration and mutuality is thereby supplied."284 In the 
other, Young Men's Christian Association v. Estill, the court said that 
"if, on the faith of the promise, the promisee ... expends money and 
incurs enforceable liabilities in furtherance of the enterprise the prom-
isor intended to promote, the consideration is supplied and the prom-
ise is rendered valid and binding."285 Corbin ended the section with 
Presbyterian Church and Martin v. Meles. The message suggested by 
the section's title and confirmed by the cases just quoted was plain: 
the doctrine of consideration was itself sufficiently flexible so that at 
least some gratuitous promises should be regarded as supported by 
consideration even though the reliance on the promise was not "the 
motive of the promisor or the inducing cause of his promise." How 
Corbin's version of a Restatement rule would have looked can be gath-
ered from his formulation in a footnote in his 1919 edition of Anson: 
"[C]onsideration may consist of acts in reliance upon a promise even 
though they were not specified as the agreed equivalent and induce-
ment, provided the promisor ought to have foreseen that such action 
would take place and the promisee reasonably believes it to be 
280. A. CORBIN, supra note 113, at 222. I have not counted the opening case in Corbin's 
section, Thomas v. Thomas, 2 Q.B. Rep. 851, 114 Eng. Rep. 330 (1842), a case also used by 
Langdell and Keener as well as Williston and one that does not speak to reliance but that shows 
that the consideration need not be the only or even the principal inducement for the promise. 
281. 191 U.S. 379, 386 (1903); see text at note 30 supra. The other case was Brawn v. Ly-
ford, 103 Me. 362, 69 A. 544 (1907) (the detriment lacked "the element of inducement" because 
not at the promiser's "solicitation"). 
282. Carr v. Maine Cent. R.R., 78 N.H. 502, 102 A. 532 (1917). 
283. 220 Mo. 522, 119 S.W. 400 (1909). 
284. Underwriter Typewriter Co. v. Century Realty Co., 118 Mo. App. 197, 203-04, 94 S.W. 
787, 788 (1906). 
285. 140 Ga. 291, 295, 78 S.E. 1075, 1077 (1913). 
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desired. "286 
Thus in the early twenties, three views on the effect of reliance on a 
gratuitous promise had been expressed. The most revolutionary was 
the hint in Williston's treatise - never pursued by him - that the law 
might abandon the doctrine of consideration and retreat to the histori-
cal requirement of reliance. Less startling, perhaps, was Corbin's view 
that the doctrine of consideration itself might be modified to accom-
modate reliance that had not been bargained for.287 Most cautious 
was the path suggested by Williston's question as to whether an alter-
native doctrine of promissory estoppel might be created by generaliz-
ing from the charitable subscription cases. How did the Restatement 
come to take this cautious path in section 90? 
Although his casebook did not betray it, Williston's views on the 
proper role of reliance as a general basis for enforcement underwent a 
significant change between his 1903 edition and the drafting of section 
90. From his early recognition of the possibility that reliance might 
support a charitable subscription, he came to accept reliance as a gen-
eral basis for enforcement of promises. His attitude toward Kirksey v. 
Kirksey is indicative of this. A footnote to his 1903 edition quoted a 
later Alabama opinion in which the court spoke of the "great diffi-
culty" in discerning "the line which separates promises creating legal 
obligations, from mere gratuitous agreements."288 Williston evidently 
held out Kirksey as a case on the latter side of the line, to be compared 
with Devecmon, a case on the former side. There is no suggestion that 
a different decision might have been reached on the basis of reliance. 
No change in Williston's attitude toward Kirksey appeared in his 1906 
edition of Pollock 289 Devecmon was there cited for the proposition 
that "[i]n case of doubt where the promisee has incurred a detriment 
on the faith of the promise, courts will naturally be loath to regard the 
promise as a mere gratuity, and the detriment incurred as merely a 
condition. "290 
Although the 1922 edition of Williston's casebook showed no 
change in his attitude toward either Kirksey or Devecmon, his 1926 
commentary for the Restatement showed a startling departure from 
his earlier views on both cases. After stating Kirksey, he added, "The 
286. w. ANSON, PRINCIPLES OF THE ENGLISH LAW OF CONTRACT 124 n.1 (A. Corbin ed. 
1919) (emphasis deleted). In 1918 Corbin wrote, "We are looking for a sufficient cause or reason 
for the legal enforcement of a promise. This problem ... must exist in all systems of law. With 
us it is called the problem of consideration." Corbin, Pre-Existing Duty, supra note 216, at 376. 
287. Recall, however, that Holmes wrote, "It would cut up the doctrine of consideration by 
the roots, if a promisee could make a gratuitous promise binding by subsequently acting in reli-
ance on it." Commonwealth v. Scituate Sav. Bank, 137 Mass. 301, 302 (1884). 
288. 1 S. WILLISTON, supra note 55, at 190 n.1 (quoting Bibb v. Freeman, 59 Ala. 612, 616 
(1877)). 
289. See text at note 255-57 supra. 
290. 1 S. WILLISTON, supra note 107, § 112, at 233. 
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injustice of the result is manifest."291 And of Devecmon he said, 
It can hardly be supposed that this was anything other than the promise 
of a gift for a special purpose, yet the injustice of denying recovery after 
the promise had been relied upon, was of such compelling force that the 
court held the question should be submitted to the jury.292 
Apparently under pressure from Corbin, Williston had ventured along 
the cautious path: 
If the law is to be simplified and clarified, it can be done only by coordi-
nating the decisions under general rules not by stating empirically a suc-
cession of specific cases without any binding thread of principle. In fact 
there is a binding thread in all the classes of cases [including charitable 
subscriptions and gratuitous bailments] which have been enumerated, 
namely, the justifiable reliance of the promisee.293 
Williston's failure even to mention Ricketts v. Scothorn 294 in his sup-
porting commentary was consistent with his portrayal of section 90 as 
a cautious generalization from specific situations rather than a restate-
ment of a broad principle already developed in the courts. Indeed, for 
"greater caution," he inserted the words, "[i]f injustice can be avoided 
only by enforcement of the promise."295 
Corbin came gamely to accept his partial victory. Much later, he 
wrote that he generally "accepted and followed" the analysis that the 
American Law Institute had used in its Restatement, but that the re-
quirement of a bargain that the Institute "has seen fit" to use in its 
definition "made it necessary" immediately to "construct a number of 
additional rules stating when an informal promise will be enforceable 
without any consideration at all."296 Foremost among these addi-
tional rules was, of course, that of section 90. 
Although Williston and Corbin, both notable for their anthologies, 
had played central roles in the development of section 90, the impact 
of their anthologies is questionable. It is not even clear to what extent 
Williston's casebook reflected his view at the time he drafted section 
90, for the relevant part had not been significantly revised for two de-
cades. Corbin's casebook, on the contrary, surely reflected his view, 
291. AM. LAW INST., supra note 262, at 18. 
292. Id. at 17. 
293. Id. at 19-20. 
294. 57 Neb. 51, 77 N.W. 365 (1898) (grandfather bound by gratuitous promise to pay 
granddaughter $2000 so she would not have "to work any more," when she relied by quitting 
work). Williston cited it in his treatise, 1 S. WILLISTON, supra note 107, § 139, at 307 n.22, but 
ignored it in his casebook, though Costigan had included it in 1921 (see note 200 supra), perhaps 
to spare students such heretical views. Corbin twisted Ricketts to suit his views, saying that if a 
promise is subject to a condition that the promisee can fulfill, "fulfillment" of the condition will 
usually be held to be sufficient consideration. A. CoRBIN, supra note 113, at 235 n.22. In his 
1919 edition of Anson, however, he explained that if the promisee in the charitable subscription 
case had begun work or incurred liabilities, this "sometimes becomes a kind of estoppel contract 
like that in Ricketts v. Scothorn." W. ANSON, supra note 286, at 142 n.3 (emphasis deleted). 
295. AM. LAW INST., supra note 262, at 20. 
296. 1 A. CORBIN, CONTRACTS § 116, at 504 (1963); lA id. § 193, at 189-90. 
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but it had had only a few years to gain influence. What role, if any, it 
played in Corbin's attempt to push Williston in the direction of recog-
nizing reliance must be left to surmise. Neither the history of section 
45 nor that of section 90 suggests that anthologies exerted an influence 
in the development of contract that was as significant as the influence 
they exerted in the development of precedents through the establish-
ment of leading cases. 
CONCLUSION 
On balance, the impact of the casebook during the Age of the An-
thology was less than beneficent. Casebooks surely helped to mark 
leading cases for immortality, but, at least in the instances examined, 
they seem to have had little effect on the development of doctrine. 
And they clearly had a chilling effect on scholarship by directing 
scholarly energies to a subject artificially confined by the curriculum 
and by encouraging its treatment in a manner suitable for a student 
audience. 
But all that is behind us. The modern contracts casebook is a far 
cry from Langdell's primitive anthology. We who edit such casebooks 
can be certain that with the rich mixture of cases and materials that 
we provide, free of the tyranny of the curriculum, we have avoided the 
shortcomings of the Age of Anthology. We can be confident that the 
score of contracts casebooks that we offer will do more than identify 
important cases - that they will serve not only the ends of classroom 
instruction but of scholarship, while contributing to the development 
of doctrine. Or can we? 
